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Representation, Mandate, and Agency: A
Kommentar on Louisiana's New Law
Wendell H. Holmes·
Symeon C. Symeonidest
This Article is a presentation and constructive critique of Louisiana s new law of
representation and mandate. The Article compares the provisions of the new law with the
solutions developed by Louisianajurispnulence as well as with the equivalent institutions ofthe
Roman law, mndem continental civil law, and American common law.
The Article concludes that, despite several shortcomings, the new law makes a
significant contribution to modem civil law in general and to the law of mixedjurisdictions in
particular. While being fo.ithfal to Louisiana s civilian heritage, the new law recognizes the
realities ofcontemporary transactional practice and the needfor some uniformity with the law
ofthe surrounding common law states. To that end, the new law appropriately sanctions certain
usefal commnn-law institutions, such as apparent authority and wrdisc/osed agency, and recasts
them in tenns compatible wiJh a civil code. If only for this reason, the new Louisiana law is
worthy of a careful examination by other civil-law or mixedjurisdictions that recognize the
same needs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act No. 261 (Act or
Revision) which revised the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 on the institution known as mandate in the civil law and
agency in the common law. The Act went into effect on January 1,
1998, and, by its own terms, "[it] shall apply to existing mandates
and procurations, unless the application would impair obligations or
vested rights."1 This is an article-by-article commentary2 on most of
the articles3 of the new Act.
The new Act was drafted by Professor AN. Yiannopoulos, who
served as the Reporter for this project under the auspices of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, the official law reform agency of the
state entrusted with the revision of the Louisiana Civil Code and
other codes. It is therefore fitting that this Commentary, like this
issue of the Review, is dedicated to him. Professor Yiannopoulos has
devoted more than two decades of his professional life to revising
I.
1997 La Acts 261 (codified as LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2985-3032 (West
Supp. 1999)).
For an excellent recent discussion on the issue of retroactivity under
Louisiana law, see J. Randall Trahan, 1ime for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana s
Intertemporal Conflict Law (Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REv. (forthcomi ng 1999).
2.
This form of article-by-article commentary is a continuation of previous attempts
to introduce to Louisiana a fonn of writing that is both common and popular with busy
judges and practitioners in other civil-law jurisdictions. For previous attempts, see Symeon
C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Kommentar, 68
TuL. L. REv. 69 ( 1993); Symeon Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of
Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA. L. REV. 69 (1983).
3.
The new Act comprises articles 2985 through 3032 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
This Commentary discusses articles 2985 through 3023. The remaining nine articles deal
with termination of the mandate and the mandatary's authority. Because of the space
limitations of this Review, these latter articles are not discussed here. Also for the same
reasons, articles 3001 through 3015 are discussed in a very brief fashion.
For purposes of accountability only, it is noted that the discussion of Articles 2985
through 2950, 2998, and 2990 through 3000 is authored by Professor Symeonides, while the
discussion of Articles 2991, 2993 through 2997, and 300 I through 3023 is authored by
Professor Holmes.
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and modernizing the Louisiana Civil Code. He began in the 1970s
with the revision of Book II of the Civil Code on Things and, when
that massive project was completed,4 he turned his indefatigable
energies to Book 1,5 and then to Book ill. 6 More than twenty years
and

600 civil code articles after he began his legislative work,

Yiannopoulos has earned the title of le /egislateur.
The revision of the mandate articles is Professor Yiannopoulos's
latest, but by no means his last,7 legislative project. Coincidentally,
mandate was also the subject on which he published his first law
review article in Louisiana, a few months after his arrival to the state in
1958.8 In that article, Professor Yiannopoulos tried to dispel the
confusion that characterized the treatment of the subject by some
Louisiana courts by bringing to bear his vast knowledge of the civil
law tradition and his keen understanding of the common law. Almost
forty years later, he had the opportunity to implement his ideas for
reforming the law of mandate, at least to the extent permitted by the
realities of the collective process under the Institute's deliberative
bodies, the Advisory Committee,9 and the Council. Notwithstanding
these collective--and also necessary-restraints, however, he, as the
drafter of the Act, is the proper recipient of either praise or blame,
whichever is due. This Commentary dispenses both.
Most of the blame, however, is on matters of detail. Overall, this
assessment of the new Act is a decidedly positive one. The Act has
taken some bold steps in recognizing and legitimating some useful
common-law institutions such as undisclosed agency and app arent
authority, which have long been part of the fabric of Louisiana

A.N. Yiannopoulos, Forward, LA. Civ. CODE at xxxvi-xxxvii (A.N.
The Revision of Book II was completed in four installments
m the years 1976 to 1979.
See id. Title III on Personal Servitudes was enacted in 1976·
Titles IV-VI on Predial Servitudes, Building Restrictions and Boundaries in 1977· Title I o
Things in 1978; and Title II on Ownership in 1979.
e id. In 1990, a new ti le o n Co
ownership was added. See id.
5.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Book I, Title I (Natural and Juridical Persons) and Title
III (Absent Persons), enacted in 1987 and 1990, respectively.
�ee id. Book _III, Title VI (Matrimonial Regimes, 1979), Title XXIII (Occupancy
6.
an Possession, 1982), Title XXIV (Prescription, 1982-83), and Title v (Obligations Arising
W ithout Agreement, 1995).
He is alre�y working on revising the provisions of Title XIII of Book
7
III on
:
Deposit and Sequestration.
Se: �thanas�i?s N. Yiannopoulos, Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency

4.

See

.
y1annopoulos
ed., West 1999).

&

�

t

�

. �- .

in

. Tracfztzon and Moder_n Practice
Louisiana. Civilian
, 19 LA. L. REv. 777 (1959).
.

9.
The composition of the Advisory Com mittee was as follows:
Marc Amy· Dian
T. Arruebarren Jeanne P. Breckinridge; Diane L. Croche
t; Cary G. deBessonet; Ro ert A.
Hawthorne, Jr.,
C. Hebert; Stephen E. Mattes ky; Symeo n C. Symeo
nides; Susan G ·
Talley; Robert P. Thibeaux; and James J. Carter, Jr.,
Staff Attorn ey.

�
�

b

1999]

A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA 'S NEW LA W

1091

transactional practice and jurisprudence. At the same time, the Act has
stayed close to the civilian origin of Louisiana law and, by introducing
the general concept of representation and separating procuration from
mandate, has realigned the Louisiana Civil Code with its modem
European counterparts. These developments and others are discussed
below.

II.

REPRESENTATION AND PROCURATION

A.

Representation
Art. 2985. Representation
A person may represent

another person in legal relations
provided by law or byjuridical act. This is called representation.10
Art. 2986.

as

The authority ofthe representative

The authority of the representative may be conferred by law, by
contract, such as mandate orpartnership, or by the unilateraljuridical
act ofprocuration.11
1.

A New Name for an Old Concept
Articles

2985 and 2986 introduce a new name for

an

institution

that has always existed in Louisiana, namely the notion that one
person may act juridically for another in a way that directly produces
legal consequences for or against that other person. This notion is
called "representation."12
As used in the above articles,
representation is broader than the terms "procuration," "power of
attorney," "mandate," and "agency," in that all the latter terms
contemplate a representative relationship that owes its origin to the
volition of the represented expressed directly or indirectly.13 In
contrast, as article 2986 provides, representation may also come into
l 0.
l l.

LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2985 (West Supp. 1994).
Id. art. 2986.

Today this elementacy notion is taken for granted, being recognized by virtually
12.
all legal systems. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a smoothly functioning transactional
practice in a legal system that does not recognize this concept. However, this has not always
been so. For example, in its traditional formalism, the classical Roman law was slow to
accept the notion that the juridical acts of one person can bind another. Although Roman Jaw
did recognize several instances in which a person could act through an intermediary, it did
not recognize a comprehensive conce pt of representation. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TExr
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 533-39 (Peter Stein ed., 3d ed. 1963).
The recognition of this concept in the civil law world was the result of medieval continental
legal science, especially of Grotius and the natural law school of thought. See REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF 0BUGATIONS:
ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE ClvILIAN
TRAnmoN 45-58 (2d ed . 1992).
13.
These terms are defined infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text
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existence by operation of law and regardless of the will of the
represented, such

as

in the case of minor unemancipated children

who by law are represented by their parents. 14 This is the only new
element introduced by-and perhaps the only utility of--the above
articles, namely: ( 1) to alert the reader to the fact that, in addition to
persons whose power to represent derive from the will of another,
there are also persons whose power to represent another is granted
directly by law; (2) to provide a new term of art for all persons
authorized to represent others, regardless of the source of the
pertinent power; and, (3) to signify the similarity and the common
denominator in their respective functions by employing the same
"umbrella term" for all classes of representatives.

2.

Legal Representation in Modem Civil Codes

Because consensual or conventional representation (by
procuration or mandate) is addressed in detail by other articles of
Title XV and is discussed below, the only type of representation that
calls for some discussion here is representation by law. As a general
concept, this is a uniquely civilian institution.15 To understand the
need for this institution and to appreciate its utility, one must begin
with two basic concepts: capacity to have rights and duties (so
called "personality") and capacity to enter into juridical acts. In
earlier periods of history, including early Roman law, certain persons
such as children o r slaves lacked both types of capacity. For those
persons the institution of representation had no role to play.16 Today,
under Louisiana law, all natural persons possess the former

14.
15.

S eei nfra note 49 and accompanying text.

For a brief but excellent comparative discussion of this subject in the English
2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
98 -1 08 (1 977). For extended discussions in other languages, see, for example, WOLFRAM
MOL�ER-F�IENFELS, DIE VERTRErUNG BEIM RECHTSGESCHAFT 1 66 (1955) ; Hijmans, La
R epr es entat wnDa ns Les Acts Juridi qu es, i n TRAVAUX DEL' ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT N
(1 949). For an equally excellent discussion with regard to children, see SJ. Stoljar, Chi ldren,
Pare nts a nd Gua rdia ns, i n 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 7
( 1973) ; RENE P_OPESCO-RAMNJC�AN<?, DE LA REPREsENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES EN
DROIT COMPARE (1 927) ; FranyOIS Rigaux, Le statut de la representation, i n 20 BIBLIOTECA
language, see

VISSERIAN (19 63).

1 6. In early Rom� law, children of any age were subject to the pat er famili as'
absolute power and authonty (pat �ia pot estas) and did not have capacity to acquire rights.
Conse quently, not only were they incapable of contracting b y themselves but neither could
_
_
�ybody else contract m thetr name. The pat er famili as would act not for them, but for
himself. S ee �UCKLAND, supra note 12, at 533-37 ; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 12, at 4 5-58.
Under these crrcumstances the concept of representation was unnecessary.
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capacity,17 and most persons who have reached majority possess the
latter capacity as well.18 For persons who possess both types of
capacity, legal representation is unnecessary and conventional
representation becomes an option for those who choose to act
through an intermediary.
The institution of legal representation becomes necessary for
those persons who possess the former but lack the latter capacity.
Today, this includes unemancipated minors as well as majors who
because of a mental or physical infirmity are incapable of taking care
of themselves. Recognizing this inability, civil law systems19 place
these persons under a protected status, one of the consequences of
which is a total or limited incapacity to enter into certain juridical acts.
Precisely because the reason for imposing this incapacity is to protect
rather than to punish the incapable, these systems seek other
mechanisms for replacing, to the extent possible, the withdrawn
capacity. Providing such a mechanism is necessary not only for the
sake of these persons (enabling them to fulfill their basic needs and
rendering meaningful their "capacity to have rights and duties")20 but
also for the sake of society at large (for example, facilitating the flow
of transactions).21
The mechanism that civil law systems have
developed to this end is the institution of legal representation, whereby
a person designated in advance or chosen by a court is empowered by
law to act on behalf of the incapable person under procedures and
limitations defined by law.
These procedures and limitations, as well as the pertinent
nomenclature, differ from one legal system to another and from one
institution to the next, but they all possess the above basic character
istics. For example, most civil law codes provide that parents
"represent the[ir] children ...in all civil acts";22 that "[t]he guardian
1 7. S ee LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1 993) (" All natural persons enjo ygeneral
legal capacit yto have rightsand duties.".
)
1 8. See id. art. 2 8 ("Anatural person who has reached majorit yhascapacit yto make
all sortsof juri dical acts,unless otherwise provided b ylegislation.").
19. For the corresponding institutions of the co mmon law,see Stoljar, supranote 15,
at 99 - 1 47.
20. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 27 (West 1 993).
2 1. Se e A. TOUSSIS, GENIKAI AR.CHAI TOU ASTIKOU DIKAIOU [GENERA L PRINCIPLES
OF THE CIVIL LAW] 65 6 (2d ed. 197 8) .
22.
CODICE CIVILE [ITALY C.c.] art. 320 (Ital y;
) s ee a lso § 1 62 6 BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F. R .G.) ("B yvirtue of the parental authority the father and the mother
have ... the right and the dutyto take care ofthe person and propert yofthe child ... [and
this] includes the representation of the child.";
) GREEK CIV. CooE art. 1 501 ("The father
represents the child in any juridical act relating to its personal status or its patrimon y
.");
a cco rd art. 1 52 ALLGEMEINES BORGERLI CHES GESETZBUCH [Aus. ABGB] (Aus.); C6DIGO
CML [SPAIN C.C.] art. 15 4 (Spain) (Julio Romarach , Jr. trans., 19 84) ; C6DIGO CIVIL [ ARG .
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represents [the minor] in all civil acts";23. and. th�t curators of
le the same
Interdicts or of other incapable persons have m prmc1p
representative powers as the guardian ofminors . 24 Civil-law countries
Uefine these representative powers in varying detail in the titles of the
particular civil code dealing with parental authority, guardianship
(tutorship), and curatorship, respectively, and all are found in the Book
of the code entitled "Persons"25 or "Family Law."26 The principles that

·!

•

•

are common among the above three cases of legal representation,
however, are placed in a separate Title under the heading
�'Representation," where they are treated together with the general
This Title is placed in
principles of conventional representation.
different books of the civil code-in Italy in the book on Obligations,27
and in Germany and Greece in the book on General Principles28which contain principles that apply throughout the civil code (and

throughout the whole of private law) unless displaced by more specific
statutory provisions.29
:
The scheme of the German, Greek, and to a lesser extent the
Italian, civil codes appears abstract but is sy stematic and efficient. All

the common principles encountered in all relations in which one
person acts as a representative of another (whether or not the power to
do so is derived from the law or from a juridical act) are placed in that
part of the civil code in which all general principles are placed. All the
specifics of the underlying (internal) relationship between the
fepresentative and the represented are placed in the parts of the civil
�ode where these relationships are regulated, that is, in the part dealing
With parental authority, tutorship, curatorship, and mandate,
respectively.

C6o. Crv.] art. 3 08 (Arg.); CODE CIVIL SUISSE [Swrrz. Cc] art. 304 (Switz.); MINPO, art. 884
(Japan).
23. ITALY C.c. art. 3 57 ; acco rd§ 1 793 BGB; GREEK CJv. CODE art. 1 63 1 .
4. See Swrrz. Cc art. 42 4; see also §§ 1 9 1 5, 1 793 BGB; GREEK Crv. CooE art.
1698
25. See Book One of the Italian Civil Code entitled "Persons and the Family."
2 6. S�e Book Four of the German Civil Code and Book Four of the Greek Civil
Code
. .
'e. ntitled
"Fanuly Status."
�
.
�7 . See Chapter VI, arts. 1 387 -1 400 of Title II ("Contracts in General" )
o f Book F our
("Obltgattons") of the Italian Civil Code.
: ,,2 8. See Title 5 (§§ .1 <!4-1 8 1 ) of Section III ("Juridical Acts") of Book One ("General
:P� � of the Gennan Civil
Code; Chapter 7 , arts. 2 1 1 -235 of Book One ("General
ll>rinc1ples,,) ofthe Greek Civil Code.
i:
29. For the function of the Book on General Principles in the
· ·1
Greek and Gennan CIVI
todes see Symeon c s ymeom·des, lhe General
Principles of the Civil Law in
l
GREEK LAW 53 , 53 -5 4 (Konstantinos D. Kerameus
& Phaedon J. Ko
s

�

�::������).
'

·

�
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Legal Representation in the French Code civil

The French Code civil, being older than the aforementioned
codes, did not achieve, and perhaps did not aspire to, the same degree
of systematization as other European civil codes. It does not
expressly provide for the umbrella concept of representation that
encompasses not only conventional but also legal representation.
Instead, the Code civil regulates expressly only the contract of
mandate, although this is only one of the many ways in which a
representative relationship can come into existence. This is not to
say, however, that the Code civil does not recognize the concept of
legal representation. For example, it provides that parents "represent
the minor in all civil acts,"30 as do tutors31 and curators.32 In contrast
to the aforementioned codes, however, the Code civil does not extract
from these forms of legal representation their common principles and
does not treat them together in a separate title devoted to that topic.
In the 1940s, the Commission set up to reform the Code civil posed
the question of whether one should "construct a general theory of
representation applicable to all juridical acts or whether one should
be content to refer that matter to the book on contracts. "33 The
question was answered by drafting a section entitled "De la
representation" which was to be included in the chapter entitled ''De

30.

CoDE

CIVIL [FR. C. crv.] art. 389-3 (Fr.).

This article provides . in part:

"L 'administrateur

legal representera le mineur dans taus /es actes civils, sauf /es cas dans
/esque/s /a /oi OU /'usage autorise /es mineurs a agir eux-memes. " ("The legal administrator
represents the minor in all civil acts, except cases where the law or usage authorize minors to
act for themselves.'1 Id. The "legal administrator" is the parents if the parental authority is
exercised by both parents and, if not, the custodial parent. See id. art. 389; see also id. arts.

389-392.
31.
See id. art. 450.
32.
See id. art. 492 which speaks of an adult person placed under tutelage as a person
who ''has need of being represented in a continuous manner in the acts of civil life" ("a
besoin d'etre represente d'une maniere continue dans /es actes de la vie civile"). For a
discussion in English of this and the above cited articles of the Code civil, see 1 PLANIOL &

RIPEIIT, TREATISE ON TIIE CML LAW pt. 2, nos. 1635-2106, at 14-245 (La St. L. Inst. trans.,

12th ed. 1959).
33.
TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE REFORME DU CODE CIVIL 34 (1947-48) (author's
trans.); see also Wolfram Miiller-Freienfels, The Law of Agency, in CIVIL LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD 77, 83 n.25 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965) [hereinafter Milller
Freienfels, Agency].

[Vol. 73:1087
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la formation des acts juridiques."34 Unfortunately, for reasons
unrelated to this discussion, the reform never matenal 1zed .35
"

4.

"

Legal Representation in Traditional Common Law

Although civil law systems take the concept of legal
representation fo r granted and consider it the best, if n?t �e �nly
.
m echanism for enabling incapable persons to partake m Jundical
acts common-law systems have never bought into the idea of a
co�prehensive concept of legal representation. 36 In fact, they have
not accepted this concept even with regard to the parent-child
relationship37 which, in civil law systems, was the birthplace of legal
representation.38 The reasons for the common law's reluctance to
recognize this institution are many and varied, but they probably
include the following:
(1) The fact that the common law never had the concept of
patria potestas which in the Roman civil law gradually gave birth
to the primordial instance of legal representation of children and
later of other incapable persons;39

34. See 'fRAVAUX, supra note 33, at 399. For a discussion of this, and other aspects
of the French Code Revision Project from the Louisiana perspective, see Robert A.Pascal, A
Report on the French Civil C,ode Revision Project, 25 TuL. L. REv. 205, 208- 13 ( 1 95 l ).
35. For an earlier Projet which had adopted the idea described in the text, but which
also did not materialize, see PROJET DU CoDE DES OBLIG ATIONS DU CoM1TE FRANCO-ITALIEN
POURL'UNION LEGISLATIVE ( 1924,

1927).

This statement is limited to the "traditional " common law, as opposed to current
statutory law in common-law jurisdictions . No attempt has been made to examine the extent
to which contemporary common-law systems have introduced similar concepts by statute.
37. See Stoljar, supra note 15, § 7-206. "[A] basic difference between ANGLO
is that in CONTINENTAL, including SOC!ALIST,
AMERICAN [law] and CONTINENTAL law....
law the parents are by law the administrators of their minor children's property as well as
their representatives." Id. § 7-206, at IOI.
[G]enerally in all ju�sdi�tions � COMMON LAWO the parents do not qua parents
.
po� s an inhere?t nght m rela�on to the assets of their children. Unless they are
specifically appomte? as �ard1ans ?r trustees, they have no more right than a
stranger to do anything with the children's property: nothing in their status as
_
parents entitles them to administer it.

36.

Id. § 7-206 �t 1 02 (fo�tnote omitt�).
:

"� C:�ntinental (but again not ANGLO-AMERICAN) law
th� par �nts inherent nght to adnumster is JOIDed by a legal right of representation . . . The
.
nu�or, m o�er words, thus gets an automatic (legal or statutory) representative not
only
.
entitled but indeed reqmred to act for him." Id. § 7-2 1 1 at 104. "In ANGLO-AM
ERICAN
Iaw
'
.
.
. "t"lO sy stem of representation
. . . n � ah �m
exists: hence for purposes both of administration
.
.
and l1t1g at1on, a guard1an needs to be appointed ... ". Id. § 7-213 at
1 06·' see a lso 2
'
ZWEIGERr & KOTZ, supra note 1 5, at 102-03.
38. See 2 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 1 5 at I 02 .
39. "It is probable that the Common La w has
no comprehens1ve statutory
representation beeause 1t d"d
1 not have the concept of patria potestas ." Id.
·

·
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(2) The fact that, from the beginning of its history, the common
law has looked at these matters through the prism of agency
which is too different a concept from which to extrapolate
solutions for the predicament of legal incompetents. Indeed,
common law agency differs from civil law legal representation in
several ways, including the following:
(i) agency depends on the volition of the principal
(whether that volition is expressed or implied, actual or
imputed, and whether it is expressed through acts or
omissions), whereas legal representation is independent of
the volition of the represented who, after all, is incapable of
formulating or expressing a volition;
(ii) agency connotes a relationship in which the principal is
capable of exercising control over the agent (whether or not
that capacity to control is bargained away), whereas in legal
representations the represented lacks the capacity to control
the representative (which is why the legal order provides
other vehicles of control, such as court supervision, consent
of"family council," etc.); and
(iii) to the extent that an agency relationship qualifies as, or
sufficiently resembles, an employment relationship, it can
give rise to delictual liability of the principal for the acts of
the agent, whereas legal representation as such never entails
delictual responsibility of the represented.
(3) Unlike the civil law, the common law was never bothered by,
and in fact invented, the notion of separating legal and equitable
title. In turn, this notion gave birth to the institution of the trust
which provides an alternative means of protecting children and
other incompetents who own property. With that institution in
place, the need for an additional or parallel (albeit less expensive)
mechanism of protecting children and other incapables was not
as strong in the common law as it might have been in the civil
law world; and

(4) The general aversion of the common law towards
abstraction. Indeed, there is no denying that legal representation
is a theoretical construct, the practical utility of which depends on
the details. Some systems prefer to focus on the details without
worrying about how the details fit into a general scheme. Both
the common law and the early Roman civil law began that way.
Modem civil law has taken the latter step of constructing the
general scheme within which the details fit.

1098
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Legal Representation in the Old Louisiana Civil Code
Not surprisingly, the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 an 1870
.
Like the French code and unlike the

?

followed the French model.

Gennan, Greek, or Italian codes, the Louisiana Civil Code does not
contain a separate title on representation in general, and treats the
conventional representation only in the context of the contract of
mandate.40 However, until 1960, the Louisiana Civil Code, like the
Code civil, did contain several provisions which recognized the
existence of the concept of legal representation with regard to
parents,41 tutors,42 and curators of interdicts.43 In a stroke of genius,

the drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 decided to purge

the Civil Code of most of these provisions44 and to replace them with
40.
S eeLA. Crv. CODE arts. 2985-3034 (1870).
S ee id. arts. 222, 235. Article 222 provided that the parents' authority to deal
41.
with the minor's property was the same "as in case of minors represented by tutors .... " See
id. art. 222. Article 235 provided that parents ''may, as long as their children are under their
authority, appear for them in court in every kind of civil suit, in which they may be interested,
and they may likewise accept any donation made to them." S ee id. art. 235. In 1960, the
above quoted portion of article 222 was moved to the Code of Civil Procedure. S ee LA.
CODE.CN. PROC. ANN. art. 4501(West 1961).
42.
S ee LA. Crv. CODE art. 337 (1870). This article provided that tutors "shall have
the care of the person of the minor, and shall represent him in all civil acts ." Id. In 1960, this
article was repealed and replaced with a similar article in the Code of Civil Procedure. S ee
LA. CODE. CN. PROC. ANN. art. 4262 (West 1998); s ee also i nfra note 48 (quoting Code of
Civil Procedure article 4262).
43. S ee LA. Crv. CODE art. 415 (1870) (subjecting curators to the rules governing
tutors). In 1960, this article was replaced by a similar article in the Code of Civil Procedure.
S eeLA. CODE. Crv. PROC. ANN . art. 4554(West 1961).
44. Of the provisions cited supra in notes 41-43, only article 235 was left in the Civil
Code. This is somewhat ironic because although most of the articles moved to the Code of
Civil Procedure were substantive. S ee, e.g., LA. CODE. CN. PROC. ANN . art. 4261 (West
1998). Article 235 could qualify as procedural to the extent it speaks of representation "in
court in every kind of civil suit." LA. Crv. CODE ANN . art. 235 (West 1993). Furthermore,
the fact �at !fle only article l:ft in the Civil Code gives parents plenary power of
.
representation m court, �ut only hrmted power of representation in juridical acts outside the
context of C<?urt �roceedmgs (for example, only to "accept any donation") is another anomaly
th� coul� give i:is� to � a contrario argument th at parents lack the power to represent their
.
.
�nor ch�ldren m Jurtdtc �l acts o�er than donations. The reason this argument would be
mcorrect ts the fact that �us power ts granted b y th e Code of Civil Procedure, albeit through a
cross-reference to the articles on tutors. S eeinfra note 4 5 .
The pur�g �f pro�isions of this kind from the Civil Code continued in the revision
of
the l�w of obhgattons m 1984. Until that time, article 1785 of the Civil Code
of 1870
.
.
,,
pro�tded that unemanc1pated mmors could contract ''with the intervention
of their tutors
which und�.� the sch�� of the Code also included parents. LA. Crv.
CODE art. 1785 ( J 870) .
.
.
The word mtervenhon . ts ambiguous. It could mean either that th
·
e mmor
cou Id contract
through th: med'' urn of the tutor, that 1s,
. with
. the tutor acting as the minor's representati
ve or
.
that the mmor himself could contract but with the tutor's co
' ·
n�
ce. I n et·ther case, this
provision served a useful purpose in that it affirmative)
pr?�1 e a means through which
minors could enter into contracts. The i 984 Obligations
evts� on removed the above-quo�ed
provision without explanation, although the Revision
.
did prov1de expl anatlo
ns for removing

�

:r;i
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identical or similar provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure under
an arrangement that is a marvel of draftsmanship.45 This decision
would have been understandable if one were to assume that legal
representation of minors and interdicts is necessary only in the
context of court proceedings. However, even these drafters must
have known better46 because the articles they were removing from
the Civil Code provided for representation "in all civil acts"47 and
because the new articles of the Code of Civil Procedure also provide
for representation "in all civil matters."48
Be that as it may, there has never been any doubt that in
Louisiana, minor unemancipated children are represented by their
parents, that this power is granted directly by law, and that, as long as
the parent's maniage lasts, the power exists without the necessity of
court confirmation.49 In contrast, in the case of tutors and curators of
other provisions from the former article. See LA. av. CODE ANN . art . 1 923 cmts. (West
1987) (replacing former article 1785). The articles surrounding article 1 923 address
situ ations in which an unassisted unemancipated minor enters into a contract b y himself, and
even recognize the role of their "legal representatives" in rescinding such a contract, see, e.g.,
id. arts. 1 919, 1 921, b ut are completely silent on the possibility of minors contracting through
their parents or t utors. Although this apparent gap could prove problematic, the problem is
avoided if one keeps in mind that the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure, see infra notes
45-46, 48, which, although not mentioned in any of the comments under the Obligations
articles, recognize the representative role of parents and tutors.
45. For ex ample, the Code of Civil Procedure devotes fifteen det ailed articles
(articles 4261 -4275) to the less common institution, the tutorship of minors, and therein
provides that the tutor "sh all represent [the minor] in all civil matters." LA. CoDE av. PROC.
ANN . art. 4262 (West 1 998). Then, the Code devotes only t wo articles to p a rents and through
a cross-reference to the articles on tutors gives parents the same powers "as in [the] case of a
minor represented by a t utor." Id. art. 4501 (West 196 1 ). The Code does the same with
regard to curators. See id. art. 4554.
46. W h at the drafters apparently did not know was how to define the limits of their
own jurisdiction. For example in article 4261 they provide: "The tutor shall h ave custody of
and sh all care for the person of the minor. He sh all see that the minor is properly reared and
ed ucated in accordance with his station in life." LA. Crv. CODE PROC. ANN. art. 4261 (West
1998). While this article is well-drafted and almost poetic, does it belong in a code of
procedure?
47. See LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 337 (1 870) (repealed 1960) (emph asis added); see
also supra note 42.
48. See LA. CoDE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 4262 (emph asis added) (West 1 998) ("[The
tutor] shall enforce all obligations in favor of the minor and sh all represent him in all civil
matters.''). Through cross-references in the pertinent articles, this article is also made
applicable to parents and curators of interdicts. See, e.g., id. arts. 4501 (parents), 4554
(curators) (West 1 96 1 ).
49. For detailed discussion of the subject of legal representation of minors and other
incompetents, see KATIIERINE s. SPAIIT, LoUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE §§ 1 5-18 (2d ed.
1998); Christopher L. Bl akesley, Child Custody and Parental Authority in France, Louisiana
and Other States of the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 283 (1981); R obert A. Pascal Contracts ofthe Minor or His Representative Under the
Louisiana Civil Code, 8 LA. L. REv. 383 (1948); C . Ellis Henican, Jr., Com ment, Care ofthe
,

Person and Property ofthe Minor, 32 TuL. L. REv. 299 (1958).
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interdicts, the power is also granted by law rather than by the volition
.
of the represented, but the representatives must be appomted by the
court.50
The same is true in most other instances of legal representation
provided by the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure, such as in
the cases of: "absent person[s]" who own property in this state that is

under the authority of a court-appointed curator;51 absent creditors who

are represented by a court-appointed attorney;52 "unrepresented,"
"non-resident," or "absentee" defendants who are represented by a
court-appointed attorney as provided in articles 5091 -5098 of the Code

of Civil Procedure;53 "absentee" heirs or legatees who are represented
by a court-appointed attomey;54 a ''vacant succession" that is
administered and represented by a court-appointed "administrator;"55
etc.56 The fact that in the above cases the "representative" is appointed
by a court rather than directly by law does not mean that these are
')udicial" rather than "legal" representations. After all, the court's
authority to appoint a representative is granted by law rather than by
the represented person. 57
Similarly, the fact that in some of these instances the
representative is authorized to act in his own name rather than in the
name of the represented does not mean that he is not a true
representative. 58 After all, even in cases where the representative is
permitted to act in his own name, he is still required to act for the
benefit of the represented. Any doubts that might have existed under

50. See LA. CODE Crv. PROC. ANN. arts. 403 1-446 1 (tutors), 4541-4557 (curators)
1 998).
5 1 . See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 47-48 (West 1 993).
52. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3088 ( 1 870): "Absent creditors . . . are to be represented
by an attorney . . . . "
53. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 509 1 -5098 (West 1 998).
54. See id. art. 3 1 7 1 .
55. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 1097 (West 1 952); LA. CoDE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts.
3 121-3122 (West Supp. 1999).
56. Obviously, the above does not purport to be an exhaustive list of legal
.
(West

representatives. For example, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Revised Statutes are
replete with provisions authorizing court appointment of attorneys to repre�ent children and
other persons incapable of representing themselves. See, e.g. , LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9 :345
(West 1991) (attorney to represent the child in visitation proceedings); id. § 9 :603 (attorney to
represent absentee minor or in�erdict ; id. § 9:3 1 85 (curator ad hoc for absent defendant).
ve-mentioned mstances, the will of the represented is irrelevant because
57. In e
the case of minors and interdicts) or factually (as in the
the represented is either legally (as

� a?o

J

�

case of absentees or absent persons) mcapable of conferring the power.
58 . Se�, e.g. , LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4264 (West 1 998) (providing that "[t]he
tutor ac m his own name as tutor, and without th e concurrence of the minor"); see also
P �cal, m SPAHT, supra �ote 49, § 15. 16: "To say that the father (or mother) represents the
. own name, not in the name of the minor."
rrunor means that he acts m his

�

.
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the old law, which confined the definition o f mandataries to persons
who acted "in [the principal's] name"59 had long been resolved by the
60
jurisprudence which recognized the concept of undisclosed mandate,
and have been completely eliminated by the new definition of mandate
which considers as mandataries all persons who ''transact one or more
affairs for the principaf' under his express, implied, or apparent
authority, and regardless of whether they do so in their own name.61
Conversely, the fact that the representative may act in his own
name rather than in the name of the represented should not obscure the
fact that, like a mandatary, the representative acts not on his own
behalf or benefit, but rather on behalf and for the benefit of the
represented. Finally, the fact that, as in the case of the mandatary, the
juridical acts of the representative operate directly in favor of or
against the represented distinguishes these representatives from other
persons such as trustees who, although they also act for the benefit of
62
others, do so in their own name and in their own right.
6.

The Utility of the New Articles

New articles 2985 and 2986 are not intended to and do not
change any of the above principles. After all, these articles are
merely definitional rather than substantive. As said earlier, their only
function is to draw attention to the existence of all these various
kinds of legal representation and to suggest that there are certain
similarities between them and certain aspects of conventional
representation. This suggestion o f similarities, however, is very
indirect and incomplete. It can be surmised from the use of a
common term to encompass both legal and conventional
representations (the umbrella term "representation"), from the
creation of a new chapter called "Representation," and from
changing the name of Title XV from "Of Mandate" to
"Representation and Mandate. "63
It would have been highly desirable if the new Act were to take
the next logical step and provide expressly that ''unless otherwise
provided, legal representation is subject to the rules governing

59.

LA. Crv. CODE art. 2985 (1870); see also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying

60.

See Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852, 855-56 (La. 1947); see also discussion

text.

infra notes 293-298 and accompanying text
6 1 . LA. CIV. CooE ANN . art. 2989 (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added); see also
discussion infra Part III.A.
62. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN . §§ 9: 1 73 1 , 1 7 8 1 , 2061, 2118-2123 (West 1 991).
63. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN., Book II, Title XV, ch. 1 (West Supp. 1 999).
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mandate to the extent that their application is compatible with the
S�ch an article would �ve the
practical effect of making applicable m a supplementary fashion the
articles on mandate to fill the gaps of those parts of the code that deal

particular legal representation.''64

with legal representation.

These gaps are not negligible, especially

because many instances of legal representation are provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure, which is ill-equipped to deal with substantive
institutions. An even better and bolder step would have been to follow
the model of the modem civil codes described above and to actually
identify those common principles between legal and conventional
representation and to treat them together. 65 This solution would have
been a real service to the legal profession and would have brought
Louisiana law to the twentieth century just before this century is about
to expire.
While it is regrettable that the new Act has failed to take either of

these steps, it is also important to note, in the interest of accuracy of
the historical record, that this failure should not be blamed on the Act's
drafter, Professor Yiannopoulos, whose proposals to that effect were
rejected by the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute. This
august deliberative body, which is known for its commitment to
progress, thought that the only proper use of the term ''representation"
was the use made in Civil Code article 88 1 to describe the right of
descendants of an heir who had predeceased the de cujus to inherit in
the heir's place.66 Ironically, that article recognizes that this so-called
Apparently, in the eyes of
some members of the Council, this fiction has displaced reality so that
any other use of the term representation, even one that is closer to the

representation is "a fiction of the law. "67

dictionary definition of it, would be confusing. Eventually, a majority
of �e Council grudgingly allowed the use of the term representation in
articles 2985-2986 but under the express condition68 that the Reporter

64. As the reader will notice, the above quoted
tracks almost verbatim the
languag� of LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2988, infra textsentence
accompan
ying note 7 1 ' regarding
procuration.
65. �or an indication of what these common principles might encompass, see the
. t articles of the Italian,
_ Greek, and German civil codes, cited supra notes
pertinen
66. See LA. CIV. C�DE �- art. 881 (West Supp. 1 999) ("Representation22-28.
of the law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place' degree andis na"gfiction
hts of
the person represented.").
•

A researcher would
in vain for means of documentin th
d1. ss10�. Th old practice of�esearch
In�tu
te was to tape-record the Council's �eli:er:�::
��
�
t
sti.�t�:��t �CC::c�: :::1�e�=��� �� =o:ne::�; :�: :: :�
�:g�: eth�
mm
e utes. smce the nud- I990s, the praca· ce of tape-recordmg
. the discussions
67.
6 �.

; f

Id.
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would draft a comment specifically explaining the difference between
this tenn and the fictional representation of article 881.69 Under these
circumstances, any attempt to do more, such as by taking either of the
two steps suggested above, was bound to fail.
Fortunately, none of this prevents courts from taking at least the
first of the steps suggested above, namely recognizing the similarities
between legal an d conventional representation and filling the gaps left
by the rules regulating the fonner through an analogical application of
the rules governing the latter. The new articles pennit and encourage
this development, an d in that sense this is their real utility.

B.

Procuration
Art. 2987.
A

Procuration defined; person to whom addressed

procuration is a unilateral juridical act by which a person, the
principal, confers authority on another person, the representative, to
represent the principal in legal relations.
The procuration may be addressed to the representative or to a
person with whom the re�resentative is authorized to represent the
principal in legal relations. 0
Art. 2988.

Applicability ofthe rules ofmandate

A procuration is subject to the rules governing mandate to the extent
that the application of those rules is compatible with the nature of the
procuration.71

1.

Confusion of Terms and Concepts in the Civil Code of 1 870

New article 2987 defines "procuration" in a way that separates it
conceptually from the contract of m andate. In so doing, the new
article eliminates the confusion of terms and concepts that
characterized the Louisiana Civil Code's prior provisions on this
subject, a confusion that was traceable to the Code's French sources.
has ceased, and the minutes have become very brief, describing only the Council's decisions
but not its discussions.
69.
The Reporter faithfully complied. See LA. av. CooE ANN. art. 2985 cmt (c)
(West Supp. 1999) (stating that, as used in article 2985, representation "has nothing to do
with the use of the word 'representation' in the law of successions to denote 'a fiction of the
law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place, degree, and rights of the
person represented,' that is the deceased ancestor") (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 881
(West Supp. 1 999)). Equally unnecessary, but also attributable to the same reason, is another
statement in the same comment stating that, as used in Article 2985, ''the legal institution of
representation has nothing to do with the use of the word representation to denote statements
made by one person to another. " Id. art. 2985 (citations omitted).
70.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 (West Supp. 1 999).
71.
Id. art. 2988.
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Article 2985 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 used the two terms
interchangeably by providing that "[a] mandate, procuration or letter
of attorney is an act by which one person gives power to another to
transact for him and in his name, one or several affairs. "72 This article
was taken from the French Projet du Gouvernement of 1 800,73 which
was also the source of article 1984 of the Code civil.74
Interestingly, the first Louisiana version of the above article was
somewhat less confusing. In the Digest of 1 808, the opening words
of the pertinent article were "[ l]e mandat ou procuration" which
were translated into English as "[a] procuration or letter of
attomey."75 The addition of the term "letter of attorney" was an
understandable attempt to explain to a primarily English-speaking
readership the meaning of the rather obscure French word
procuration.16 More interesting was the fact that the English text did
not contain the word "mandate. "77 This, however, was not a
mistranslation. Despite the tendency to question the competence and
sometimes the integrity of the translators of the 1808 Digest, here the
failure to use the English word "mandate" made the translation more
LA. Crv. CODE art. 2985 (1870) (repealed 1 997).
See Projet du Gouvemement art. 1 , reproduced in COMPILED EDmON OF TIIE
CIVJL CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph Dainow ed. 1972), codified at LA. STAT. ANN. art. 2986
(West 1972).
74. Article 1 984 Code civil provides:
Le mandat ou procuration est une acte par lequel une personne donne a une
autre le pouvoir defaire quelque chose pour le mandant et en son nom.
Le contrat ne seforme que par I 'acceptation du mandataire.
[Mandate or procuration is an act by which a person grants to another the

72.
73.

power to do something for the principal and in his name.
The contract is formed only through acceptance by the mandatary.]
FR. C. CIV. art. 1 984 (author's trans.) (emphasis added). The two paragraphs of this article
were proposed as two separate articles in the Projet du Gouvemement. See Projet du
Gouvemement, supra note 73. As will be explained, their combination into one article in the
Code Napoleon helps reduce the confusion described in the text.
75. See LA. CI� . CODE art. 1 ( 1808); infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. The term 1s, of course, of Latin origin. In classical Roman law, a procurator
. bonorum was a freedman (former
ommum
slave) who was appointed by the master to look
after and administer his property. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note
act of appointment
was call� the procuratz.o. G�ually, and �ery cautiously, Roman1 2.lawTheeventually
granted to
and agamst the master certam legal actions for the juridical acts entered into
by the
J?'°?''�tor on the m�er's behalf See id. Thus, the procuratio was one of the Roman
1�stttunons out of which eventually grew the more general concept of representation For
discussi.on of the. procur�t�, �ee J.H. Michel,
es observations sur l 'evoluti�n du
Procurator en dro1t Ro am, m ETUDES OFFERTES AQuelqu
JEAN MACQUERON 5 1 5 ( 1970).
The new Act dehberately and correctly avoids using the common-law terms "letter of
�����y" and "power of attorne
y." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 cmt. (a) (West Supp.
'!'

77.

See LA. Crv. CODE art. 1 (1808).
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accurate78 for the sense in which the French tenn "mandat" was used
in the French original was synonymous with the French term
"procuration" in that they both signified the unilateral juridical act by
which the principal (the "mandant") confers representative power on
the mandatary (the "mandataire").79 It would therefore be redundant
to use both words ("mandat" and "procuration"), especially because
the use of another synonym ("power of attorney") was thought
necessary. Additionally, this latter synonym, although a distinctly
common-law term and thus objectionable on that ground, was
conceptually closer to the meaning of "procuration" in that it too
connotes the unilateral juridical act by which the representative
power is conferred. In contrast, depending on context, the French
term "mandat" can mean either the unilateral act of conferring the
representative power80 or the bilateral juridical act (contract) that
results when the mandatary accepts.81 Because the latter is the more
common usage of the tenn, its use as a synonym to procuration is
confusing. By avoiding this use, the 1 808 translators, and later the
1 825 translators, were able to avoid this confusion.
Unfortunately, in the less erudite revision of 1 870, this
confusion was not avoided. As seen above, the 1 870 Code uses the
terms "mandate," "procuration," and "letter or attorney"
interchangeably. 82 This terminological confusion is eliminated by
78.
In contrast, the failure of the 1 80 8 translators to include the words "et en son
("and in his [the principal's] name'') in the English text resulted in a n inaccurate
translation. See COMPII..ED EDmON, supra note 73, at 3 9 1 (discussing Digest of 1 808). This
omission might have also been less innocent in that it runs contrary to one of the basic
features of the French scheme, namely its steadfast refusal to recognize undisclosed a gency.
See infra text accompanying notes 137- 1 3 8. This omission was cured in the 1 82 5 and 1 870
Codes which reinserted the above quoted words in the article. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN.
art. 2954 ( 1 825) (Comp. ed. 1 972), with LA. Crv.CODE art. 2985 ( 1 870). However, since
1947, these words have been effectively "read out" of the article. See Sentell v. Richardson,
29 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. 1 947) (recognizi ng undisclosed agency); see also infra notes 293298 and accomp anying text.
79.
This is confirmed by reading together the first two articles of th e French Projet
which were combined into one article (article 1 984) by the Cade civil. See supra note 74.
By reading the second paragraph of this article, one easily understands that the term
"mandat" in the first parag raph of the same article is used in the sense of the unilateral act of
conferring the power (i.e., as a true synonym to procuration) rather than in th e sense of the
contract of mandate. This inference becomes less clear when the two provisions are placed
in separate, albeit consecutive articles (as was done in the French Projet an d the Louisiana
Digest of 1 808), and much more difficult when these ar ticles are not consecutive (as was the
case in the Civil Codes of 1 870 and 1 825, where these articles were separated by two other
articles). See LA. Crv. CODE arts.
2985-2988 ( 1 870).
See, e.g. , FR. C. CIV. arts.1985, 1 988, 1 989.
80.
81.
See, e.g. , id. arts. 1 986, 1 992, 2003, 2008. For the text of the relevant provision,
see supra note 74 (quoting FR. C. crv. art. 1 984).
82.
See LA. Crv. CoDE art. 2985 (1870).
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new article 2987, which defines procuration in the sense of the
unilateral act described above and sets it apart from the tenn
"mandate," reserved exclusively to denote the bilateral juridical act
or contract between a principal and a mandatary.83
2.

Confusion in the French

Code civil

In addition, new Article 2987 eliminates the conceptual
confusion which beset not only the Louisiana Civil Code but also the
French

Code civil. Indeed, the Code civil (and hence the Louisiana

Civil Code o f 1870) stands apart from modem civil codes in one
important respect. Except for cases of legal representation described
earlier in this Article, the Code civil views conventional
representatio n as being tied inseparably to the contract o f mandate.84
It defines mandate as necessarily including the power of the
mandatary to represent the principal.85 In the scheme o f the Code

civil, a mandate without this power is n ot a mandate; and outside the

sphere of legal representation, this power cannot exist without a
mandate.86 The former element is a departure from the Roman
definition of the contract of mandatum which did not carry with it the
power of the mandatary to represent the principal.87
The latter element is something from which modern civil codes

have departed, mostly as a result o f the influence of the work of Paul
Laband, a nineteenth centwy German scholar.88 The German Civil
Code and all th e civil codes influenced by it adopt a sharp distinction
between the conferral of power of representation (Vollmacht), on the
one hand, and the underlying relationship between the representative
and the represented, on the other hand.89 The former is a unilateral
83. See LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art. 2987 (West Supp. 1999).
84. See FR. C. CIV. art. 1984.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See BUCKLAND, supra note 12, at 5 1 4-21 , ZIMME RMANN surpra note 1 2 at 41314, 420-21 .
88. See Pa�l Laband, Die Stellvertretung bei dem Abschluss von Rechtsgeschiiften
nach dem Allgemeznen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch ' 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR HANDELSRECHT
1 83 (l 866).
89. This s".Paration is evidenced by the fact that, as explained above, these
codes
devote a se�arate tttle to the general co�cept �f representation and then regulat
e the contract
of mandat� tn the part of the code dealmg wtth nominate contracts. See supra
Part II ·A 2
The meam�g of�1s separate treatment is that the power to represent anothe
r is ind
d�;
of the relanonsh1p between the represented and the representa"
epen ·
. ·
.;ve. ThIS
IDdependence IS
.
. to detect m cases of legal representation where as explain
easter
ed bo
th re e ented
does not express any will either to have, or especially to select a
repr
se t tiv or 0 0rm a
_
contractual relationshi
p with him or her. See su ra Part 11·A.2
.
c
c v
representation, however, this independence is mo e difficu
lt to disc
e
·

�

'

'
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juridical act, while the latter is a bilateral juridical act-a contract.
That contract can be a mandate, which in these codes does not on its
own entail representative powers, a partnership, an employment
contract, a contract for services, or any other similar contract.
This separation of representation from mandate is considered by
some German authors as one of the greatest accomplishments of the
modem civil law.90 If this is true, then one might say that, by adopting
a similar though not as complete separation, the new Act has moved
Louisiana a step closer to modem civil law.91
3.

Conceptual Differences Between Procuration and Mandate
Under the New Act

Under the new Act, the differences between procuration and
mandate can be gleaned from juxtaposing the two definitions provided
in new articles 2987 and 2989, respectively.
Article 2987

Article 2989

A procuration is a wrilateral juridical act A
by which a person, the principaL
confers authority on another person, the
representative,
to represent the principal in legal
92
relations.

mandate is a contract

by which a person, the principal,
confers authority on another person,
the mandatary,
to transact one or more affairs for the
principal. 93

This juxtaposition reveals the following conceptual differences
between procuration and mandate:
(1) A procuration is a unilateral juridical act, whereas a mandate
is a contract, i.e., a bilateral juridical act;94
(2) In both acts, one person, called the "principal," confers
authority on another person, called "representative" and
"mandatary," respectively;
(3) The content of the conferred authority is different. In a
procuration, the authority is to "represent' the principal, that is, to
to have a representative, his selection, and the relationship with him all owe their origin to the
actual or imputed will of the represented.
90. See Milller-Freienfels, Age ncy , supra note 33 , at 81 ("The clear and sharp
distinction of these two notions has been one of the major achievements of nineteenth
century European legal science."); Hans Dolle, Juristische E ntdecku nge n,
42
VERHANDLUNGEN DES ZWEIUNDVIERZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES B l (1959) (calling
this notion one of the most remarkable ·�uristic discoveries" in legal history).
9 1 . The newest continental civil code, the Dutch Civil Code of 1992, adopts the same
separation. See BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] bk.3 tit.3, bk. 3 tit.7 (Neth.).
92. LA. Crv. CODE ANN . art. 2987 (West Supp. 1 999).

93.
9 4.

Id. art. 2989.
See infra Part II.B.4.
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:

act in the principal's place as the principal would ha�e �ted 5 In
;
a mandate, the authority is to ''transact . . .for the pnnc1pal, that
is, to cany out a particular activity and accomplish a result for the
benefit of the principal.96

(4) In a procuration, the authority is to represent the principal "in
legal relations," that is, in acts o f a juridical nature. In a mandate,
the authority is to transact "one or more affairs for the principal,"
that is, to cany out acts of either a juridical or material nature, or
both.
Beginning with the last point, there is little doubt that the tenn
"affairs" as used in new article 2989 encompasses material acts. This
is stated directly in the comments accompanying this article97 and can
also be gleaned from the fact that the same term is employed in the
articles of the Civil Code regulating the institution of n egotiorum

gestio, that is the management of the "affairs" of another without a
mandate.98 Indeed in the context o f the latter institution the quoted
term is understood as encompassing primarily material acts, although
it does not exclude juridical acts.99 What is also clear is that the use of
the word "affairs" as opposed to 'j uridical acts" in the new article
2989 was as deliberate as it was consistent with the traditional
100
definition of mandate.

In turn, the use of the broader term "affairs" in the definition of
mandate helps explain the most important conceptual difference
between mandate and procuration. Although procuration and mandate
95. The word "represent" suggests that the representative must act in the principals
name. Indeed, in continental civil law the representative must so act. See FR. C. CIV. art.
1 984; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text. However, this is so because these
systems explicitly refuse to sanction what is known in common-law systems as the concept
of undisclosed agency. See supra note 78; infra notes 1 37-138 and accompanying text. The
fact that the new Act expressly recognizes this concept, see infra note 308 and accompanying
text, suggests that the word "represent" in article 2987 must be understood as also
encompassing situations in which the representative acts in his own name but on the
principal 's behalf. See infra Part 11.B.4.
96. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989 (West Supp. 1 999) (emphasis added).
97. See id. cmt. (d): "[A]n 'affair' may be either a juridical act or a material act.
Louisiana decisions may be found in which a mandatary was charged with th e responsibility
for certain material acts." (citing Roth v. B & L Enters., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1 094 (La 1 982)
(receiving pa�ent); :'-laynick v. Jefferson Bank & Trust Co., 45 1 So. 2d 627 (La. Ct.
App.
1 984� (colle�ting of mdebtedness); Craft v. Trahan, 3 5 1 So. 2d 277 (La. Ct.
App. 1 977)
.
(making repair eshmates)).
98. See id. arts. 2292-2297 (West 1 997).
9�. See id art. 2292 cmt. {b) ("The affair managed may be a mater
ial act, such as the
pro�ect1on o� property from fire or flood, or the execution of a juridical
act' such as a sale of
penshable thmgs. ").

100. See id. art. 2989 cmt. (e) (West Supp. 1 999) ("Limiting the
contract of mandate to
.
.
. al acts would be an unnecessary departure from the
Jund1c
civilian tradition.").
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may-and usually do-coexist in the same relationship, this is by no
means necessary. A procuration, namely, the conferral of authority to
represent, is not an essential element of a mandate. At least in theory,
a mandatary need not be a representative. For example, a mandatary
that is authorized to do only material acts for the principal is clearly
not a representative. Conversely, a representative need not be a
mandatary. For example, as explained above, a legal representative
such as a tutor or a curator is clearly not a mandatary, if only because
the relationship between the representative and the represented, not
being a contract, cannot be a mandate. Even in cases of conventional
representation, however, the underlying relationship between the
representative and the represented need not be based on a contract of
mandate. It may be based on a partnership contract, an employment
contract, or another nominate or innominate contract.
4.

Procuration Is a Unilateral Juridical Act

As said above, article 2987 defines procuration as a "unilateral
juridical act." What is the meaning of the quoted term, and what is
the practical significance of so defining the procuration?
Regarding the first question, it is worth noting that this is the first
1
01
time the term ''unilateral juridical act" is employed in the text of the
Louisiana Civil Code102 or, for that matter, any other Louisiana statute.
Although neither this term, nor the broader tenn ')uridical act"103 is
10 I . This term was first used in the comments under articles 5 1 7 and 654, also drafted
by Professor Yiannopoulos in 1979 and 1 977, respectively. See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 517
cmt. (c) (West 1 980) (referring to "[a] unilateral juridical act, such as an acknowledgement");
id. art. 654 cmt. (b) (stating that "conventional servitudes may arise from contracts as well as
from unilateral juridical acts").
l 02. The Civil Code speaks of "unilateral contracts" which it defines as those in which
''the party who accepts the obligation of the other does not assume a reciprocal obligation."
Id. art. 1907 (West 1 987). It is clear that this term has nothing to do with the homonymous
term ''unilateral contract" as used in the common law. It is equally clear that a unilateral
contract as defined in article 1907 differs from a unilateral juridical act in that the former is a
contract, while the latter is not. According to article 1906, a contract is an "agreement by two
or more parties." Id. art. 1 906 (emphasis added). In a unilateral act there is only one party,
and thus there is no "agreement" and no "contract."
l 03. Until Professor Yiannopoulos began his revision of the Civil Code in the 1 970s,
the term "juridical act" was not used anywhere in the Civil Code. The first time this term
was employed in the text of a Civil Code article was in 1977. See LA. av. CODE ANN art.
544 (West 1 980) ("Usufruct may be established by a juridical act . . . . ). In the intervening
20 years before the enactment of the Mandate Revision, the term ')uridical act" has been
used in 14 other Civil Code articles, all but one of which have been drafted by Yiannopoulos.
See LA. CN. CODE ANN arts. 7, 28, 49 (West 1 993); id. arts. 492, 495, 654, 776, 797, 807
(West 1980); id. arts. 347 1 , 3483, 3541 (West 1 994). In addition, the term ')uridical act" is
used in the comments under 35 other Civil Code articles, all but 1 2 of which have been
drafted by Yiannopoulos.
.

'
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defined by the text of the Civil Code, the� �earrings are no onger
disputed. A juridical act is any lawful volit1onal act (declarat10n or
manifestation of will) intended to produce legal consequences to

�

which the law attributes the intended consequences or other legal
consequences. 1 04 A juridical act is unilateral when it is the product of
the will of one party1 05 and its completion or effectiveness does not
depend on the will of another party. A juri cal �t is bilateral or
multilateral when it is the product of the combmed wills of more than
one party. A testament is the clearest example of a unilateral act, 1 06

�

while a contract is the clearest example of a bilateral juridical act.
The second question asked above is more difficult because,
despite being a unilateral act, the procuration-by its very nature-
always contemplates the possibility of becoming the basis of a bilateral
act in that it invites the expression of will or the act of another party,
When that party expresses his will to act
the representative. 1 07
pursuant to the grant of authority or acts accordingly, a contract

I 04. The definitions provided by the comments to several articles of the Civil Code
are helpful. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 492 cmt. (b) (West 1980) (stating "a juridical
act is a manifestation of will intended to have legal consequences"); id. art. 3471 cmt. (c)
(West 1994) (stating "[a] juridical act is a lawful volitional act intended to have legal
consequences"); id. art. 3483 cmt. (b) (stating a juridical act is "a licit act intended to have
legal consequences'').
105. A juridical act that contains the declarations of will of multiple persons may still
be a unilateral juridical act if those wills are "parallel and cast in the same direction." SADL
THE CIVIL LAW OF
LITVINOFF & w. THOMAS TITE, LoUISIANA LEGAL l'RANSACITONS:
JURIDICAL ACTS 144 (1969). Examples of such acts are a procuration issued jointly by
several principals naming the same representative or a joint renunciation of a servitude by the
co-owners of the dominant estate.
106. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. arts. 626 (West 1 980) (renunciation of usufruct); id. arts.
737, 77_1:772 (renunciation of predial servitudes); id. arts. 1014-1015 (West 1952)
(renunc � �on by heirs); id. art 1802 (renunciation of solidarity); id. art. 2348 (West 1985)
:
(renunciation ?Y. a spouse of �ght to concur in management decisions); id. art. 3029 (West
1994) (renu�ct�tion of authonty by mandatary); id. arts. 3449-3451 (renunciation of right to
pie� pr�ption); see also id. art. 2339 (West 1985) (declaration by a spouse reserving the
fruits o� his ?r her separate property); i�: arts. 3433-3434 (West 1994) (abandonment of
_
possess1�n); id. arts. 3424-3425 (acqu1S1tion
of possession); id. art. 3418 (acquisition of
ownership of3:° abandoned movab�e by occupancy); id. art. 977 (West 1952) (acceptance
of
a su�ss1on�; id. art. 1559 (revocation of a donation); id. art. 368 (West 1993) (emancip
ation
of a nnnor); id. �- 1944 ��est 1987) <"offer of reward made to the public") .
107. Traditional c1vt! law terrru.nology subdivides unilateral juridica
l acts into those
.
. are and those which
which
are not addressed to a particular recipient. See Toussis
note 21, at 379. A procuration is an example of the former category
. See LA av'
ANN. art. 2987 (West Sup . 1999). The abandonme
nt of possession and the a� uisi ti on y
�
occup�cy of the ownership of an abandoned movable are
examples of the lattq
t g .
The un1l�t�l �ature of these acts is more clearly visible
in cases of the latt
g ry
because 1t 1s easier to see how these acts become opera
·
tional how they produce the1r
effectry
s,
without the assent or participation of any other party.
•

��":
�
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between him and the principal comes into existence.108 What then are
the practical consequences of classifying the procuration as a unilateral
act if, by its nature, this act is bound to evolve into a bilateral act? A
complete answer to this question belongs to the realm of the law of
obligations and is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffi ce it to say,
however, that one consequence is that the procuration's existence,
validity, and interpretation will be judged by focusing exclusively on
the principal 's person and expression of will, and not the
representative's. Another consequence is more clearly visible in cases
in which, as permitted by article 2988, the procuration is
communicated not to the representative but to a third party with whom
the representative is authorized to deal. In such a case, the principal
may, in certain circumstances, be bound by the procuration even
before the representative has knowledge of it and thus before he can
express a will to act pursuant thereto. For example, A, unbeknown to
B, publishes in a newspaper an announcement appointing B as A's
"general representative" in a specified locality. Pursuant to this
announcement, C serves B with process in a suit directed against A,
which process B accepts without knowing its contents. In such a case,
in the absence of contrary statutory provisions, the service of process
is binding on A, although there is no contract between A and B.
5.

Coexistence of Procuration and Mandate

As said above, once the representative accepts the procuration, a
contract is formed between him and the person who issued the
procuration. Although that contract need not be a mandate, in most
cases it is likely to be. Thus, procuration and mandate are likely to
coexist in many cases. However, even when they do not coexist, the
two acts will be governed for the most part by the same rules. This
flows from new article 2988 which provides that "[a] procuration is
subject to the rules governing mandate to the extent that the[ir]
application . . . is compatible with the nature of the procuration."109
108. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 cmt. (d) (West Supp. 1 999). "The recipient of
the procuration does not bind himself to do anything. However, ifhe accepts the procuration
or acts accordingly, a contract may be formed between the principal and the representative.
This contract may be a mandate or another nominate contract." Id. This comment might be
slightly misleading to the extent it implies that the "recipient of the procuration" and the
person who "accepts the procuration or acts accordingly" need be the same person.
However, as the text of the article states, this is not necessary because the procuration may be
addressed either to the representative or to a third party. In the latter case, it is the
representative's act, not that of the third party that would result in a contract "between the
principal and the representative." Id.
1 09. Id. art. 2988.
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The comments amplify this provision by stating that ''the obligations
of the principal and the representative toward each other, the rights and
obligations of the principal and the representative toward third
persons, and the tennination of the power of attorney are determined
by analogous application of the rules governing mandate."1 1 0 This
supplemental and analogical application of the articles on mandate is
both necessary and proper. It is necessary because, unlike other
modem civil codes, the new Act has not taken the bolder step of
regulating in detail representation and procuration. It is also proper
because, unlike those modem civil codes but like the French and the
old Louisiana civil codes, the new Act continues to view mandate as a
relationship whose primary function is the mandatary's representation
ofthe principal.
III. MANDATE

A.

General Principles
Art 2989. Mandate defined
A mandate is a contract by

which a person, the principal, confers
authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more
affeirsfor the principal. 1 1 1

I.

Mandate Is a Contract

Article 2989 defines mandate as a contract, that is, an
"agreement by two or more parties,"1 12 which is "formed by the
11
consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance." 3
Although article 2989 does not specifically require acceptance by the
4
mandatary, 1 1 this requirement flows easily from the very use of the
�ord "contract" as well as from the next article, article 2990, which
mcorporates by reference all the general rules of contracts' including
1
those pertaining to offer and acceptance.1 5 One of these articles is
article 1927, which �rovi �s that, in principle, "offer and acceptance
116
may be made orally, m wnting, or by action or inaction. "
De
g �andate as a contract distinguishes it from the
.
.
act of procuration, a distinction which was
Jundical
urulateral

�

�

I I O.

Id. art. 2988 cmt.
1 1 1 . Id. art. 2989.
1 1 2. Id. art. 1 906 (West 1987).
1 1 3. Id. art. 1 927.
1 1 4. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2988 ( 1 870) (sta
ting that "[t]he contract of mandate
is completed only by the acceptance of the mand t
)
1 1 5. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2990 (West
i 999)
1 1 6. Id. art. 1 927 (West 1987).
"

��

·

·
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discussed earlier. 1 1 7 More importantly, defining mandate as a contract
helps distinguish it from the common-law institution of agency which
can come into existence even in the absence of a contract between the
principal and the agent. Generally speaking, in civil-law systems, in
the absence of such a contract, one is not bound by the juridical acts of
another. Moreover, the existence of such a contract does not suffice
for holding the principal bound to the juridical acts of the mandatary.

It is necessary that these acts must have been within the mandatary's
authority as conferred by the principal. 1 18 As will be explained later,
the new Act reaffirms both of these civilian principles1 19 but also
introduces exceptions to them. Thus, according to new article 3021,
"[o]ne who causes a third person to believe that another person i s his
mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts
20
This article can apply in two
with the putative mandatary."1
situations: ( 1 ) when there is no contract at all between the putative
principal and the putative mandatary and (2) when there is such a
contract, but it does not confer on the mandatary the authority to enter
into the particular contract with the third person. In either case, the
principal will be bound under article 302 1 , and in both cases the basis
for his liability will be extra-contractual and similar to what common
law systems call "apparent authority" or "agency by estoppel."121
2.

Object of Mandate

According to article 2989, in a contract of mandate the principal
"confers authority" on the mandatary "to transact one or more affairs
for the principal."122
The comments accompanying this article
explain that the word "affairs" encompasses both juridical and
material acts. 1 23 Indeed, to transact effectively juridical acts for the
principal, a mandatary may have to cany out certain incidental and
sometimes not so incidental material acts. This is why it would have
been unwise to limit mandate to the performance of juridical acts.124
Nevertheless, a question worth exploring is whether a mandate in
which the mandatary's authority is confined to performing only
material acts is truly a mandate, or whether it is instead another
1 1 7. See supra notes 101-1 06 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g. , LA. CIV. CODE art. 3010 (1870); FR. c. CN. arts. 1989, 1998; BGB
§§ 164, 1 77; GREEK CIV. CODE arts. 211, 229; ITALY C.c.arts. 1388, 1398.
119. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3008, 3010, 3019, 3020 (West Supp. 1999).
120. Id. art. 3021.
121. See infra Part IIl.C.2.
122. Id. art. 2989 (emphasis added).
123. See id. art. 2989 cmts. (d)-(e); supra notes 97 & 100 and accompanying text.
1 24. See id. art. 2989 cmt. (e).
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contract. This other contract can be an employment contract creating
a master-servant relationship, 1 2 5 or it can be contract for ''work by the
"2
job, 1 6 referred to as contract for services.
a.

Mandate vs. Employment Contract

Distinguishing a mandate from the master-servant relationship
is important for many reasons. Not the least of which is the fact that
while a master is liable for the o ffenses and quasi-offenses of his
servants, 127 a principal as such is never delictually liable for the
offenses or quasi-offenses of the mandatary, unless o f course the
mandatary is also the principal 's servant. 1 2 8 The difference between
these two relationships has been discussed repeatedly by Louisiana
courts which have clearly articulated the criteria for distinguishing
between the two. 1 29 Thus, according to the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in

Blanchard

v.

Ogima, these criteria include one

party's right to control the activities o f the other party, the degree of
control regarding the time and space elements of those activities, and
the existence of a close economic relationship between the two
parties. 130 Thus, as the court said:
Although a servant may possess the qualities of an agent, all agents
do not qualify as servants. . . .
Employer-employee status may be
included within the master-servant relation, but principal-agent status

cannot unless

the agent is also a servant. . . .

interpreted

that particular kind o f agent who

"Servant" must be

has a very close
ec?n�mic relation t�, and is subject to very close control by. the
as

p�c1pal A servant is o�e who offers his personal services for a price.
:
He 1s an mtegral part of his employer 's business and must submit to the

control of his physical conduct as well as of his time. A non-servant
agent contributes to the business of his employer, but he is not such a

125.
126.
contracts).
127.
128.
129.

See id. arts. 2746-2750.
See id. art. 2756 (West 1 996); see also id. arts. 2756-2777 (reguIatmg
·
these

See id. art. 2320.
See 1:3lanchard v. Og�a, 215 So. 2d 902, 904, 906 (La 1 968).
_See id. at 905; Aup1ed v. Joudeh, 694 So. 2d
' 1 0 1 6 (La Ct. App. 1 997)·'
OD��O Oii & Gas Co. v. Nunez, 532 So. 2d 453 ' 462-6 1012
( a Ct. App. 1 988); Adams v
.
L?�1s1ana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 1 So. 2d 5 0 1 503- (
a Ct. App. 1 988); Hebert v.
L1vmgston Parish Sch. Bd., 438 So. 2d 1 141 1 144• (La
Ct. App. 1 983); Young Oil Co. v.
Durbin, 4 1 � So 2d 620, 627-28 (La. Ct. App. j 982).
:
,
130. It 1s the right of control of the time and phy .
. . .
. the other party and
�1cal ac�v1ties m
the existence of a close relationship between the
parties which detemune that one is a
servant." Blanchanl, 2 1 5 So. 2d at 905.

o!
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part of it that his physical acts and the time to be devoted to the
131
business are subject to control.

The above criteria were as sound under the old law as they are
under the new law. Thus, the distinction between mandate and
employment contracts should not pose any problems for Louisiana
courts under the new Act.
b.

Mandate vs. Contract for Services

In contrast, the distinction between mandate and a contract of

is more difficult because in both of these contracts the right
and degree of control over the other party's activities that
characterizes the master-servant relationship is lacking. Yet this
distinction has practical ramifications on the parties' rights and
duties, including the right to unilaterally terminate the contract.
Before suggesting an answer to this question under the new Act,
it may be helpful to briefly survey the answer given by other civil
codes. For example, the Italian1 32 and the Dutch civil codes133 limit the
scope of mandate to the transaction of')uridical acts" for the principal.
Thus, under these codes, a contract calling for the performance of only
material acts is simply not a mandate. The German and Greek civil
codes provide that a mandate may encompass material acts134 but, in
keeping with the Roman law origin of this institution, define mandate
as necessarily gratuitous.135 Thus, under these codes, a remunerative
contract, regardless of its scope, cannot be a mandate. The Frencr.t
Code civil departed from the Roman law tradition by providing that a
mandate is gratuitous but only in the absence of a contrary
agreement.1 36 Thus, under this code, the question of distinguishing
remunerative mandates from contracts for services depends on what
one considers as the essential elements of mandate. In turn, this
question depends on the definition of mandate provided in Code civil
article 1984, which defines mandate as a contract in which the
principal grants to the mandatary "le pouvoir de faire quelque chose
services

1 3 1 . Id. at 906-07.
1 32. See ITALY C.c. art. 1703.
133. See BW bk. 7, art. 400. This article recognizes the need for distinguishing
between the two contracts and defines mandate in a way that avoids overlap with
employment contracts. It defines mandate as "a contract whereby one party, the mandatary,
binds himself toward the other party, the mandator, to perform one or more juridical acts on
account of the mandator without being a relationship ofemployment." Id. (emphasis added).
1 34. See § 662 BGB; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 7 1 3.
1 3 5. See infra note 1 72.
1 36. See FR.C . CIV. art. 1 986.
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,,
,,
" hose (thing)
pour le manda nt et en son nom. 137 While the word c
oir"
encompasses both juridical and material acts, the words ''pouv
of
the
scope
(power) and "en son nom" (in his name) seem to confine
's
mandate to juridical acts,138 and the Cour de Cassation, France
highest court of ordinary jurisdiction has so held. 139 Thus, under
French law, a contract does not qualify as mandate unless: (a) it
confers the power to enter into juridical acts, and (b) these acts are to
be entered into by the mandatary "in the name" of the principal.

Conversely, a contract that authorizes only material acts or juridical
acts that are not to be conducted in the name of the principal is not a

mandate.
Until the enactment of the new Act, the pertinent codal
provisions in Louisiana were virtually identical to the corresponding
French provisions.140 The Code Napoleon of 1 804 defined mandate as
a contract which is only presumptively gratuitous141 and in which the
principal grants to the mandatary "le pouvoir . . . de faire quelque

chose pour le mandat et en son nom. "142 The same definitions were
reproduced in the Digest of 1 808, except that the word chose was
changed to ajfaires, the English translation of which was c arried over
into the Civil Code of 1 870.143 In 194 7, however, the words "and in

his name" were effectively read out by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Sentell v. Richardson, 144 thus introducing the concept of undisclosed
agency which is now codified by the new Act.145
As will be explained later, the introduction of undisclosed agency
to Louisiana was both inevitable and useful.
However, this
development eliminated one of the two French criteria for

1 37. Id. art. 1 984; supra note 74 ("the power to do something for the principal and in
.
hls name").
1 38. A Planiol concludes, "[t]he use of the word 'power' implies that it has to do with
. . . acts. .� PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra
JUnd1cal
note 32, § 2232, at 287 n.2.
1 3?, · See Judgment of Feb. 19, 1 968, Cass. Civ. I re, [1 968) Bull. Civ. No. 69 at
54-55
(Fr.). n y a rrz:i.n��t lorsque des personnes chargent une autre d 'accom
p/ir our leur
�o'!'pte un �cte 1un�1.que, . . . et non des actes materiels, sans pouvoir de re resentation
elements qui caractensent
le contrat d 'entreprise. . . " ["There is a mandate hen
rson�
charge another to ac�omplish for their account a juridical act,
and not material acts thout
_ chara
power of representation, elements which
cterize the contract for services
·
"] 11'd at
55 (emphasis added).
.

;

�

·

·

·

�
·

•

140. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2991 ( 1 870); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2960 ( 1 825) .
141. See CODE NAPOLEON art. 1986 ( 1 804) (Com
p. r
ed. 1 972).
142. Id. art. 1 984 ("the power · · · to d0 some ·
thmg ror the principal and in his name
")
(emphasis added).
43 . See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2954 ( 1 825) ; LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2985 ( 1 870) (Comp. ed.
1 972 .
144. 29 So 2d 852, 855-56 (La. 1 947)
.
:
145. See discussion infra Part III.A
.3.

;
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distinguishing between mandate and a remunerative contract of
services and thus has reduced the usefulness of the French doctrine in
fonnulating the proper Louisiana answer to the above question. Thus,
in contrast to the prevailing French solution, in Louisiana, under both
post-Sentell jurisprudence and the new Act: (1) a contract in which
one party instructs the other to act in the former party's name
continues to qualify as a mandate, but (2) a contract in which one party
instructs the other party to act in the latter party's name may or may
not qualify as a mandate. Whether or not it does so qualify will
depend on the meaning attributable to the word "affairs" and the
surrounding words used in new article 2988.
As said above, both the etymology and the history of the word
"affairs" leave no doubt that it encompasses not only juridical but also
material acts. Thus, a contract in which the principal authorizes both
types of acts can clearly qualify as a mandate contract, whether or not
the acts are to be performed in the principal's name. On the other
hand, it is submitted that a contract should not be considered a
mandate: (1) if it calls for the performance of exclusively material acts

and (2) if those acts are not to be performed in the name of the
principal. 146 1bis solution finds support in the tenor of new article
2989, especially in the use of the words "authority" and ''transact,"
both of which indicate that what is contemplated is juridical acts.147
fudeed, material acts are not ''transacted" but are rather performed or
carried out. Similarly, one does not speak of "authority" to perform
material acts. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the quoted term is not
used in any of the Civil Code articles providing for contracts for
services.148
Additional support can be found in the comments
accompanying article 2989 and in at least one other article of the new
Act, article 2999.
After explaining that the word "affairs" may
encompass both juridical and material acts, the comments to article

2989 draw attention to the fact that "most of the provisions on
mandate have been drafted with the making of juridical acts in
mind."149 One of these provisions is new article 2999 which provides
that "[a] person of limited capacity may act as a mandatary for matters
1 46. The gratuitous or remunerative character of the contract could also be an
additional but not determinative criterion.
147. See
Clv. CODE ANN art. 2989 (West Supp. 1 999).
1 48. See, e.g.,
CN. CoDE ANN. art. 2675 (West 1996) (defining a lease of labor or

LA.

.

LA.

industry as "a contract by which one of the parties binds himself to do something for the
other, in consideration of a certain price"); id. art. 2756 (defining a contract of work by the
job as a contract in which one ''undertake[s] a building or a work for a certain stipulated
price").
1 49.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN

.

art. 2989 cmt. (e) (West Supp. 1 999).

TULANE LA W REVIEW

1 1 18

[Vol.

73 : 1 087

for which he is capable of contracting."150 This provision would h�ve
.
been unnecessary if the Act contemplated mandates cons1stmg
exclusively of material acts.

3.

Undisclosed Mandate

As said earlier, the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870, like its French
counterpart, defined mandate as being necessarily representative, that
is, as requiring that the mandatary act in the principal s name. '51 This
.
requirement has been eliminated by the j urisprudence smce 1 947, thus
importing to Louisiana the common-law concept of undisclosed
agency. 152 Appropriately recognizing the tremendous usefulness of
this concept but also acknowledging the existing reality, the new Act
codifies this jurisprudence. Thus, article 2989 omits any reference to
this requirement, while articles 3 0 1 7-30 1 8 and 3022-3023 provide for
the fully or partially disclosed mandate. 1 53

4.

Mandate vs. Agency

While the introduction of undisclosed agency and the recognition
of the concept of apparent authority154 have brought Louisiana
mandate law closer to the common law institution of agency, there are
still some differences between the Louisiana law of mandate and the
common law of agency. These differences are noted at the appropriate
places in the discussion that follows.

5.

Applicability of Law of Obligations
Art. 2990.

Applicability ofthe rules governing obligations

In all mattersfor which no special provision is made in this Title, the
contract of mandate is governed by the Titles of "Obligations in
11
General " and "Conventional Obligations or Contracts. 1 55

?

Article 2 90 restates the obvious, namely, that because mandate
.
.
1t ts governed by the general rules on contracts for all
contract,
ts a
matte� for �hi �h the special rules on mandate do not provide
otherwise. S�1�arly, because, like any other contract, a mandate
generates obbgabons, those obligations are governed by the rules

150. Id. art. 2999 (emphasis added).
151. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2985
).
152. See Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d(1870
852
1947)
153. See in.fra notes 312-329, 406-415 and acco(La
m
anYI g tex�.
p
154. See infra notes 375-405 and accompanymg text
dtscussmg LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3021 (West Supp. 1999).
155. LA. Crv. CODE AN.N art. 2990 (West Supp. 1999).
·

.

.

0
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found in the title of the Civil Code entitled "Obligations in General,"
with regard to all matters not provided for in the title on Mandate.
This cross-reference helps avoid repetition. For example, it
explains why the new Act does not reproduce former articles 2988-

2990 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 which dealt with acceptance
and its modalities.
articles

1927-1 947

These matters are now governed by Civil Code
on contract formation.156

Similarly, the failure to

reproduce former article 2987, which provided that "[t]he object of the
mandate must be lawful" and that the power conferred "must be one
which the principal himself has the right to exercise," 1 57 is also
inconsequential because the same principles are contained in the
general rules on conventional obligations1 58 which are rendered
applicable through the cross-reference contained in article

2990.

Also

rendered applicable through this cross-reference are some more basic
principles such

as

the self-evident notion that strictly personal

obligations, being nondelegable, 1 59 cannot be the obj ect of a mandate.

6.

Interest Served
Art 2991.

Interest served

The contract of mandate may serve the exclusive or the common
160
interest oftheprincipal, the mandatary, or a thirdperson.
Article

Code

299 1 states
2986161

article

essentially the same rule as pre-Revision
which

had

attracted

relatively

little

jurisprudential attention. Whether the mandate serves the exclusive
interest of only one party, as opposed to the common interest of two
or more, may be significant primarily in two contexts. First, to the
extent that both the principal and the mandatary have an interest in
the subj ect of the mandate, the potential of a conflict of interest
arises.
In that event, consistent with the general status of the
mandatary as a fiduciary, 1 62 such conflicts are to be resolved in

accordance with the overriding obligation of good faith imposed by
the Code.163

156. See LA. av. CODE ANN arts. 1927-1 947 (West 1987).
157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2987 ( 1 870).
158. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN arts. 1 769, 1 966, 1 971, 2030 (West 1 987).
159. See id. art. 1 766 (defining "strictly personal" obligations).
160. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 299 1 (West Supp. 1 999).
1 6 1 . Compare id. , with LA. Civ . CODE ANN. art. 2986 (1 870) (repealed 1 997).
1 62. See infra notes 265-278 and accompanying text.
1 63. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 1 759 (West 1 987); id. arts. 299 1 cmt. (b), 3001 cmt.
(b) (West Supp. 1 999).
.

.
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Second, to the extent that the mandataiy has an interest in the
mandate, questions may arise as to its revocability by the principal.
Under pre-Revision law, the principal could generally revoke a
The former code also made reference to
mandate at will. 1 64
"irrevocable powers of attomey. "165 In tum, the jurisprudence adopted
the common law institution of an irrevocable "agency coupled with an
interest." According to Montgomery v. Foreman, the leading case on
this issue, such an agency would be created when the mandatary had
such an interest in the subject of the mandate that "the contract
containing the mandate is a bilateral or synallagmatic agreement,"166 in
which event the principal cannot revoke the mandate without just
cause. As stated by the court, ''when the authority of mandate over a
thing is given in part as security for monies advanced or obligations

incurred by the mandatary, or is necessary to effectuate such security,
then it would be inequitable to allow the principal to revoke the
mandate at will."167

Regarding termination, new article 3025 now provides that "[a]
mandate in the interest of the principal, and also of the mandatary or of
a third party, may be irrevocable, if the parties so agree . . . " 168
Although the general topic of termination is beyond this article's
scope, a few brief observations on this article are in order. First, the
comments accompanying the article do not elaborate on the type of
.

'interest' the mandatary mu�t have to trigger application of the article,
but Montgomery and other Jurisprudence will likely be looked to by
analogy.
Second, the article's requirement that in addition to the
?1andatary's interest, an agreement is nece sary for creating an
rrrevo�able �andate departs from, and narrows considerably, the rule
On the other hand, the fact that an
enunciated m Montgomery.

�

·
��.

Civ CoDE ANN . art. 3027(AX1 ) ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997) .
CODE ANN. art . 3028 (1 870) (repealed 1997)
166. 4 1 0 So. 2d l l60 1 1 67
Ct A
1 982) ee generally John C. Werhan, Note,
Agency-Revocabi/ity ofPoV:er ofSale Co�pl .r{.�h �n /nterest
, 4 LA. L. �v. 60 1 ( 1 942).
167. Montgomery, 4 1 0 So. 2d at 1 1 6
1s is to be �ontrasted with a simple interest
.
.
in the exercise of the mandate, such as a co
ss1on or contmgency fee. On the basis of this
test, the court concluded that an agreement
een �downers and a real estate agent which
gav� �e agen.t the right to develop the prop rt
y a is sole expense and to sell the property
ti
,
remitting a minimum amount per runnin
ot
owners and retaining the balance, was
an agency coupled with an interest. See i�.
l 1 7-6
CIV. CODE .AN.N art. 3025 (We
. . 16� .
st Supp. 1 999) (emphasi s added).
this is simply an exception to the g
Of course
enera1 power of the principa
l to terminate the mandate
freely. See id. cmt. (b)

e
�

A. �A.

·

IV.

(La

·
'j Wt
;
�
� ��
� � �·

·

·

LA.

.

·
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agreement c an be implied from the circumstances169 may limit the
breadth or significance of the change.
Finally, in cases where the mandate is for the interest of a third
party, the article's requirement that an agreement between ''the parties"
is necessary for making the mandate irrevocable is ambiguous. Does
the article contemplate an agreement between the principal and the
mandatary, or an agreement between the principal and the third party?

It seems that either answer would be an innovation to present
Louisiana law.

7.

Onerous or Gratuitous Contract
Art 2992. Onerous or Gratuitous Contract

The contract of mandate may be either onerous or gratuitous. It is
gratuitous in the absence ofcontrary agreement.1 70
Article 2992 "reproduces the substance of Civil Code Article
2991 (1 870),"171 which followed the French solution of departing from
the Roman law tradition under which a mandate was a necessarily
gratuitous contract. 172

What remains from that tradition is merely a

presumption that mandate is gratuitous, 173 a presumption which can be
rebutted by contrary agreement.

Under general contract principles,

this agreement can be express or tacit and can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances or conventional usages.174

Indeed, the

decision of some European civil codes such as the German and Greek
to define mandate as a necessarily gratuitous contract' 75 was not only
unrealistic when made and especially thereafter, but has also resulted
in rendering almost useless the whole institution of mandate. The
French and the Louisiana codes have made a wiser choice in this
regard, and the new Act has continued that tradition.

169. See LA. av. CODE ANN . art. 2054 (West 1 987).
170. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 2992 (West Supp. 1999).
1 7 1 . See id. art. 2992 cmt.
172. See DIG. 1 7. 1 .4 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32) ( "Mandatum nisi gratuitum nullum est. ).
For discussion of the gratuitous nature of mandate under Roman law, as well as the
exceptions from and subsequent evolution of that principle, see BUCKLAND, supra note 12, at
5 14- 18; ZIMMERMANN , supra note 12, at 41 3-20.
173. If the mandate is gratuitous, then the mandatary is treated less stringently. See
LA. CN. CODE ANN . art. 3002 (West Supp. 1 999) (providing that "[w]hen the mandate is
gratuitous, the court may reduce the amount of loss for which the mandatary is liable").
1 74. See, e.g., LA. av. CooE ANN . arts. 2054-2055 (West 1987).
175 . See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
"
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8.

Art. 2993. Form
The contract ofmandate is not required to be in any particularform.
Nevertheless when the law prescribes a certain form for an act, a
1 6
mandate authorizing the act must be m thatform. 7
I

•

a.

Form and "Equal Dignity"

The comments to article 2993 aver that it "reproduces the
substance of Article 2992 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870."177
This is true of the first sentence of the new article, which indeed is
essentially the equivalent of former article 2992. ' 78

The second

sentence of the new article, however, enunciates a substantive rule
which has no counterpart in the former code articles, although it is
firmly

grounded

in

the jurisprudence.

to

According

this

jurisprudence, whenever the extrinsic law demands that an act be in

a

certain form, the authority of a mandatary to consununate that act for
his principal must be in the same form. 1 79 That rule in tum is similar,
but not identical, to an early common-law agency doctrine, the
"equal dignity rule," which required an agent's authority to execute
an instrument to be in writing if the instrument itself was required to
be in writing. 1 80
While the general principle espoused by the second sentence has
been recognized in a long line of opinions,1 81 the Louisiana Supreme
Court most recently addressed it in Tedesco

Inc.

182

In

v. Gentry Development,
Tedesco, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract to

purchase immovable property from the defendant corporation, signed

176. LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2993 (West Supp. 1 999).
177. Id. art. 2993 cmt. (a).
1 78. See A. CIV. Coo� ANN. art. 2992 1 870) (repealed 1 997) ("A power of attorney
.
may be g1ven' e1ther by a pubhc act �r by �
under private signature, even by letter. It
.
�ay also be given
verbally, but of this test1momal proof is admitted only conforrnably
to the
title: OfConventional Obligations.").
e text of new article 2993 does not address the question of proof
of the mandate; the
.
Rev1s1on relegates that question to the comments. See LA. CIV.
CooE ANN. art. 2993 cmt.(b)
(West Supp. 1 999) .
1 79. See, e.g. , Bordelon v. Crabtree, 43 So. 2d 682,
683 (La. 1 949); Ward v.
.
Penmngto
n, 434 So. 2d l l 3 1 , 1 1 37 (La Ct. App 1 983); Tchoup
itoulas, Inc. v. McCullough
349 So. 2d 346, 346-47 (La Ct. App. 1 977); Krupp v. Nelson
50 So . 2d 464 467 68 (La a'
App. 195 1 ).
1 80. See HAROLD GILL REuSCHLEIN & WILL
IAM A . GREGORY THE AW OF AGEN
CY
AND PARTNERSIIlP § 1 2 (2d ed. 1 990).
1 8 1 . See cases cited supra note 1 79.
1 82. 540 So. 2d 960 (La 1 989).

�

�
wn�g

�

.

'

'

•

L

-

·

1999]

A KOMMENTAR ON LOUISIANA 'S NEW LA W

1 1 23

by the cotporation's president. 183 The court held that the contract was
unenforceable because the president had no written authority to sell the
4
In so doing, the court refused to distinguish between
property. 1 8
actual and apparent authority; in the court's words, "[j]ust as
testimonial proof cannot be used to prove the sale of immovable

property (or the agreement to sell such property), testimonial proof
cannot be used to prove the agent's authority to execute the contract,
whether that authority was actual or apparent."185
Although Tedesco was unsurprising, given the prevailing earlier
jurisprudence, the principal irony in the court's analysis is that it
perceived a codal basis for this rule where none previously existed.
The court supported its conclusion1 86 by citing (1) article 2440, which
requires that a sale or promise of sale of an immovable must be by
authentic act or act under private signature; 1 87 (2) former article 2996,
which required express authority "to alienate or give a mortgage, or do
any other act of ownership;"188 and (3) former article 2997, which
(extrapolating from the general principle pronounced in former article

2996)

required express authority to, among other things, "sell or to

buy."189 The flaw in that analysis, however, is that neither of the latter
two code articles said anything about requiring a writing; they simply
required express authority which, obviously, can be oral as well as
written.

It is simply a leap of faith to conclude that because article

2440 requires an agreement to sell immovables to be written, former
articles 2996 and 2997 required that the express authority to execute

such an agreement as buyer or seller must be in writing as well. No
such conclusion is inexorably compelled by logical interpretation of
the then existing provisions of the Civil Code.
Neither the Tedesco court, nor the drafters of new article 2993
articulate the policy underlying the adoption of this rule. It is one
thing for the legislature to determine that, because of various
considerations associated with certain transactions, sound policy
dictates the imposition of certain formality requirements as a
precondition to their enforceability. Indeed, borrowing from their
English common law heritage and that country's

1672 "Statute against

183. See id. at 961 .
184. See id. at 965.
1 85. Id. at 964. Related issues involving apparent authority are discussed infra notes

375-405.

186.
187.
188.
189.

See Tedesco, 540 So. 2d at 964.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2440 (West 1996).
LA. Crv. ConE .ANN. art. 2996 (1870) (repealed 1997).
Id. art. 2997, amended by 1981 La Acts. 1337 (repealed 1997).
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Frauds and Perjuries,"190 all of the common-law states have some fonn
of general statute of frauds, requiring a signed, written memorandwn
for certain agreements to be enforceable,191 as w�ll as other specific
statutes of .frauds.192 It is, however, not self-evident that the same

policies always justify imposing the s�e requirements . for the
.
contract of mandate by which authonty is granted to satisfy the
signature

requirement

transactions.

attached

to

the

underlying

substantive

If we are to sanction the frustration of a party's

expectation based upon his failure to obtain written evidence193 of a
mandatary's authority to bind his principal, it would seem appropriate
to identify some good reason for so doing, given that this can be a
classic ''trap for the unwary." Frankly, it is difficult in many instances
to see what that reason is.

In that regard, it is also important to note that the rule of article

is contrary to that of the modem common law. Under the early
common law, it was clear that, for instruments required to be under

2993

seal, sealed authority of an agent was generally likewise required.194
The significance of the seal, however, has generally been abolished.195
Thus, in common law states, unless there is a specific statute requiring
written authorization of certain transactions,196 written authority is not
necessary for the execution of a writing.197

Simply put, the "equal

dignity rule" no longer generally obtains under modem common law
doctrine. In this respect, then, the Revision does not move Louisiana

law towards the national commercial mainstream. Instead it arguably
creates a minefield, especially for out-of-state lawyers .

1 90. See Statute Against Frauds and Perjuries, 1 672, 24 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.).
1 9 1 . See, e.g. , Miss. CooE ANN. § 1 5-3- 1 ( 1 972) (a traditional English-style statute).
1 92 . . For exampl �, all st�es other �an Louisiana have adopted § 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial C�e, which requrres a wntten memorandum for all contracts for the sale of
goods for the pnce of $500 or more. See U.C.C. § 2-20 1 ( 1 ).
_1 93. Of course, other formalities beyond a simple writing may appIy, fior exampIe,
notanal act.
1 94. See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF AGENCY § 28
(1 958); WARREN SEAVY,
HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF AGENCY § 19, at 35 ( 1 964).
1 95. See, e.g. , MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75_9_1 to 75_9_7.
.
.
1 96. See, e.g. , CAL. CIV. CODE § 2309 (Deenng
1 985) (p�ovtdtng that "authority to
.
.
enter into a contract required by law to be
ting c� �nly be given . . . in writing''); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 1 5-3-1 ( 1 972) (requiring tha
tra�ts within the statute of frauds signed by the
party to be charged or "some [other] person bY _
tm or her thereunto lawfully authorized in
writing").
.
In some other states however there
is no statutory requirement that an
agent have
WTJtten authonty to execute contracts
sub. t to the statute of
frauds. See, e. g. , N .Y. GEN .
OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney Supp. 1 9
1 97. See RESTATEMENT' supra note
1 94' § 3 0( 1 ) ,. REUSCHI..EIN
& GREGORY, supra note
1 80, § 1 2; SEAVY, supra note 1 94, § 1 9,
at 36.

.

�=

·

'

·

·

•
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Application of the Rule

The comments to article 2993

offer two examples of the

application of the rule as to form.198 First, because donations must be
by authentic act,199 a mandate authorizing a mandatary to make a
00
Second, because an act of
donation must also be by authentic act. 2

compromise must be written,201 a mandate authorizing a mandatary to
execute a compromise must likewise be in writing.202
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, the choice of

these examples may have the unfortunate effect of obscuring the area
in which the rule o f form has been clearly the most important, which
is transactions in immovable property. Virtually all of the reported
cases dealing with this question have involved either transfers of
immovable property under article 1839203 or contracts for the sale of

immovables under article 2440,204 although one pre-Revision case
0
extended the rule to contracts of suretyship2 5 under article 1847.206

Practically speaking, it is the stability of transactions in immovables

that is most threatened by the application o f the rule of form, and

which should be most strongly emphasized in discussions of the rule.
The above does not exhaust the possibilities for applying article

2993, which will

depend upon the sweep with which courts interpret
its reach. Another obvious example is negotiable instruments. Under
the Louisiana commercial laws, a negotiable instrument must, by its

nature, be in writing because it must be subject to being possessed,

198. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 2993 cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999).
199. See L A . CIV. CODE ANN art. 1 536 (West 1 987). Indeed, this is one context in
which the rule of form has logic. The law requires an authentic act for an inter vivos
donation because the donor is depleting his patrimony without receiving anything in return,
and thus the authentic act encourages contemplation of the consequences of his acts. If the
donor seeks to accomplish the donation through a mandatary, requiring an authentic act for
the mandate thus serves the same function.
.

.

200. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2993 cmt. {c) (West Supp. 1 999).
20 1 . See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 3071 (West 1 994).
202. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 2993 cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999).
203. See id. art. 1 839. Of course, the second sentence of article 1 839 makes an oral
transfer enforceable between the parties if the transferor admits it under oath. See id. Thus,
.

logically, if the transferor is the principal and admits under oath that he orally authorized his
mandatary to make the transfer, the lack of written authorization might likewise be cured. No
such mechanism exists with respect to a mandatary of the transferee, however.
204.
205.

I ��

See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2440 (West 1 996).
Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Loan Arranger, Inc., 604 So. 2d 656, 658-59 (La

.

Ct. App.
.

206. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 847 (West 1 987) (prohibiting the proof of promises
to pay a debt of a third person or promises to pay a debt extinguished by prescription by parol
evidence).
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Thus, it would �pear that
transferred, negotiated, and so forth.201
.
ed to reqwre wntten
constru
be
article 2993, read literally, could
authority for a mandata.Iy to execute a negotiable instrwnent for his
principal. Whether this is consistent with current usage is highly
questionable.

9.

Authority
Art 2994. General authority
The principal may confer on the mandatary general authority to do
8
.
. appropnat
,J r the czrcums
tances.20
. e unue
whatever zs

The comment under article 2994 states that "[t]his provision
resolves questions concerning the validity of a mandate conferring
general authority. "209 However, as far as can be ascertained, no such

questions have arisen, if only because the old article 2995, which is
cited as the source of the new article, provided categorically that the

mandate "may vest an indefinite power to do whatever may appear
conducive to the interest of the principal."210 In any event, the new
article

obviates

questions

as

to

whether some

expression or

specification of authority granted is essential to a mandate. Thus, a
mandatary could be hired as "general manager" of a business without
further elaboration, and thereby receive the authority to perform all
acts appropriate to that position.

Such authority would also include

that created by implication under new article 2995 , which is
11
discussed below. 2
It should b e noted that the common law uses th e concept of
"general agency" in a much different sense.

At common law, a

"general agent" is one "authorized to conduct a series of transactions
involving a continuity of service."212 The emphasis is on continuity of
service; the degree of discretion of the general agent can be very
limited in scope.213

�?1· S�e LA. �V. ��AT. �· §§ 1 0:3- 1 0 1 to 1 0:3-807 (West 1 993). For example, the
de�mtton of ,negotiation 1s a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or
involuntary, of
an mstru�ent by a person other than �e issuer to a person who thereby becom
"
es its holder.
Id. § 10.3-20 l (a).
The former version of the U. C. C ., adopted In
LOUIStana
·
· ·
·
In
1974,
mcorporated the nec�sstty of a ''writing" as part of the definiti
on of negotiable instrument,
but the present version abandons that as obvious surplusag
e. see LA. REV. sTAT. ANN.
§ 1 0:3-104, repealed by 1 992 La Acts 3 165.
208. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2994 (West Supp. 1 999).
209. Id. art. 2994 cmt
2 1 0. LA. �IV. CODE art. 2995 (1 870) (repealed
1 997).
21 l . See mfra notes 2 1 7-221 and accompany
ing text.
2 1 2. REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 3 ( 1 ).
2 1 3 . See id. § 3 cmts. (b)-(c).
.

.
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Art. 2995. Incidental, necessary, orprofessional. acts
The mandatary may peiform all acts that are incidental to or
necessaryfor the peiformance ofthe mandate.
The authority granted to a mandatary to peiform an act that is an
ordinary part of his profession or calling, or an act that follows from
the nature ofhis profession or calling, need not be specified.214
Art. 2996. Authority to a/.ienate, acquire, encumber, or lease
The authority to alienate, acquire, encumber, or lease a thing must
be gi.ven expressly. Neither the property nor its location need be
specifically described.215
Art. 2997. Express authority required
Authority also must be given expressly to:
(1) Make an inter vivas donation.
(2) Accept or renounce a succession.
(3) Contract a loan, acknowledge or make remission of a debt, or
become a surety.
(4) Draw or endorse promissory notes and negotiable instruments.
(5) Enter into a compromise or refer a matter to arbitration .
(6) Make health care decisions, such as surgery, medical expenses,
nursing home residency, and medication .216

Articles 2995, 2996, and 2997 are considered together because

they are inextricably linked, although this may not be self-evident
from their terms. As explained below, this linkage will inevitably
create difficulties for Louisiana courts in trying to reconcile the
tensions created by the interplay of the three articles.

On the purely doctrinal level, article 2995,

as

successor to former

article 3000,21 7 provides the codal basis for what the common law
would call an agent's implied authority:21 8 the authority to perform
acts that are consistent with the principal's express directions though
not spelled out therein.219 A leading Louisiana case, AAA Tzre &

214. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2995 (West Supp. 1 999).
215. Id. art. 2996.
216. Id. art. 2997.
2 1 7. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3000 ( 1 870) (repealed 1997) ("Powers granted to
persons, who exercise a profession, or fulfill certain functions, of doing any business in the
ordinary course of affairs to which they are devoted, need not be specified, but are inferred
from the functions which these mandataries exercise.").
2 1 8. Ironically, some cases construing former article 3000 have used it as the basis for
recognizing apparent, as opposed to implied, authority, a manifestly erroneous conclusion.
See, e.g., Radiofone v. Oxford Bldg. Servs., 347 So. 2d 327, 329-30 (La Ct. App. 1 977).
2 19. See, e.g., SEAVY, supra note 194, § 8. Some commentators suggest !hat there
may be distinctions between the concepts of implied and incidental authonty. See
REuscHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 1 80, §§ 14- 1 5.
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Export, Inc.

v.

Big Chief Trnck Lines, Inc. , defined the concept

as

follows:

[An agency] is created by implication when, from �e nature �f the
.
principal 's business and the position of the agent within that busmess,
the agent is deemed to have pennission from the principal t? undertake
certain acts which are . . . reasonable and necessary concomitants of the
agent's express authorization. Implied authority connote� �ssion
from the principal for the agent to act, though that perrmss1on 1s not
expressly set forth orally or in writing. Generally, one should look from
the viewpoint of the princi�al and the agent to determine whether the
agent has implied authority. 20

Article 2995, then, reflects the simple reality that one cannot
expect a principal to enumerate the full range of acts which should
logically fall within the mandatary's authority.

Rather, authority

must,

acts

practically

speaking,

encompass

those

which

the

mandatary could reasonably believe to be necessary and proper to
accomplish the purposes expressly directed by the principal.221
Conversely, articles 2996 and 2 9 9 7 seem premised on a policy
determination that authority for the specific transactions included
therein must never be implied, but rather must without exception be
express.
There are at least two difficulties with the above scheme:

One

practical and one theoretical. The practical problem is that, inevitably,
implied authority under article 2995 will subsume transactions for
which articles 2996 or 2997 ostensibly demand express authority.
That tension is well-illustrated by a pre-Revision case, Radio/one v.

Oxford Building Services.222

In that case, the plaintiff contracted to

provide a beeper paging service to the defendant through its project
manager in New Orleans.223 The defendant later sought to repudiate
the contract, arguing that its manager had no authority from the board
to make such a contract.224 Citing former article 3000, the court
concluded that the manager had "apparent authority" (in reality,
implied authority) to bind the corporation, stating that "[w]ere we to

require each business dealing with a corporation to be authorized by
written resolution before recognizing its validity, we would impede the
220.
22 1.

385 So. 2d 426, 429 (La. Ct. App. 1 980).
See id. Note that, as stated in AAA Tire, authority exists as a function of what the
mandatary reasonably believes, as opposed to the third person with whom he deals. See id.
222. 347 So. 2d 327 (La a. App. 1 977).
223. See id. at 328-29.

224. See id. at 329. It might be noted that the manager paid the initial charge for the
pager by his own personal check, although the opinion states that he signed the subscription
agreement as a representative of Oxford Building Services. See id. at 328-29.
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Thus, according to the court, corporations must
flow of commerce
be "liable for contracts entered into by their unauthorized agents when

the objects of the agreements [are] goods or services the corporation
might require in the normal conduct of its business."226
Although the court's characterization of such a species of
authority as "apparent" is clearly inaccurate, the real value of the
opinion is the court's remarkably candid observation that, were it
minded to do so, it could have just as easily struck the contract down
on the basis of lack of express authority under the former code

articles. 227 Specifically, the court noted:
We could reach an opposite result in this case by reasoning the
agreement in question was the sale of a service and rely on that part of
C.C. art. 2997, which requires authority to buy and sell to be express.
But this would defeat the purpose of C.C. art. 3000. We note an
inconsistency in the spirit in which our courts apply the apparent
authority the01"1; to validate contracts vis-a-vis the strict proof demand
8
to defeat them. 2

In other words, one lesson of Radio/one is that the unyielding
demand of articles 2996 and 2997 for express authority, without
exception, for the enumerated transactions cannot peacefully coexist
with the recognition of implied authority in article 2995. In fact,
Radiofone also teaches that the rules of these articles are clear
invitations to result-oriented jurisprudence : if the perceived equities
favor the principal, relieve him of liability for lack of express
authorization; if they favor the third person dealing with the
mandatary, uphold the contract as within the mandatary's implied
authority under article 2995. Surely this is not a generally desirable
state of affairs.
Perhaps even more troubling is that, doctrinally, no explanation is
given as to why this inherent conflict need exist at all. To begin with,
there is no suggestion as to why the specific transactions included in
articles 2996 and 2997 are singled out for special treatment, other than
the mere fact that the pre-Revision code so provided.229 One may
accept the general precept that certain transactions are, as a class, more
significant
than
others,
thus justifying specific,
"express"
authorization, but if the law makes those choices, it would be useful to

225. Id. at 329.
226. Id. The court appears to use "unauthorized" here in the sense of lacking express
authorization.

227. See id. at 330.
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. arts. 2996-2997 cmts. (West Supp. 1999).
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articulate the policies underlying the line-drawing. Why, for example,
must a mandatazy always have express authority to borrow money for
his principal, but not to hire and fire the principal 's employees?
Nothing in the commentary illuminates in any way the rationale for
articles 2996 and 2997.
Even if one were to conclude that the choices made in articles

2996 and 2997 are appropriate ones, a final question remains: why did
the drafters believe that no exceptions whatsoever should be made to
the rule that authority for the enumerated transactions must be
express? It is simple enough to posit a regime under which authority
for certain transactions ordinarily must be express, while at the same
time

recognizing

exceptions

to

that

rule

under

appropriate

circumstances.
Indeed, this essentially is the common-law approach; the
Restatement of Agency specifically articulates situations under which
the authority to buy or sell,230 lease,23 1 receive payment,232 borrow,233
and make negotiable instruments234 is inferred.
In addition, the
Restatement specifically enumerates the implied authorities of a
manager of a business. 235

See

230.
REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 52 ("Unless otherwise agreed, authority to
buy property for the principal or to sell his property is inferred from authority to conduct
transactions for the principal, if such purchase o r sale is incidental to such transactions,
usually accompanies them, or is reasonably necessary in accomplishing them.").
23 I .
id. § 67.

See

(1) Unless otherwise agreed, authority to lease land or chattels is inferred from
a�thority �o �anage the subj �ct matter if leasing is the usual method of dealing
.
_
_
with 1t or if, m view of the pnnc1pal's business and other circumstances' leasing is
a reasonable method of dealing with it.
(2) Authori ty to lease land or chattels is not inferred merely from an authority to
_
sell the subject
matter, to take charge o f it, or to receive rents from it.

Id.

�ee

232.
id. § 7 1 ("Unless oth�rwi �e agreed, authority to receive payment is inferred
from a�thonty to conduct a transaction 1f the receipt
of payment is incidental to such a
transaction, usually accompanies it, or is a reasonably necessa
ry me ans c
ior accomp 1·1sh.mg
it.").
233.
id. § 7� ("Unles� otherwise agreed, an agent is not autho
rized to borrow
.
unless such borro�� 1s usually incident to the performan
ce of acts which he is authorized to
perform for the principal.").
4
id. § 76 ("Unless otherwise a eed, an agent is
not authorized to execute or to
�
endo
eg able paper
ess �uch execution or endorsement is
usually incident to the
perfiorrnance of the acts which he 1s authorized
to perform for the principal )
.id. § 73:
· ·
235.

See

�� �

�f

�

See

"

Unless otherwise agreed, authority to
manage a business includes authority·
·
(a) to malce contracts wh· h
·d
t such business, are usually
made in it, or are reasonably nece
d
g t,·
(b) to procure equipment and
.
sup lies and to make reparrs
reasonably
necessary for the proper conduct
of the bus ess·

��� :� ��:� ?
fu
'

·
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It is true, of course, that a Restatement is, by its nature,
substantially more detailed than a civil code.

Nonetheless, some

exceptions to articles 2996 and 2997 would be consistent not only with
the spirit of the common law rules but, more importantly, with that of
article 2995 itself. Even limited exceptions are far more reflective of
the business realities of the modem commercial world and the
reasonable expectations of those acting therein. It is a safe prediction
that courts will tend to resist vigorous application of articles

2996 and
2997 to garden-variety transactions of mandataries with general

authority. Faced with the dilemmas presented by seemingly inflexible
rules, courts will seek mechanisms to create the flexibility necessary to
resolve disputes in such a fact-sensitive area.
Fortunately, ameliorative doctrines do exist. For example, the
principal who with knowledge of the mandatarts acts receives the
benefits thereof may be deemed to have tacitly ratified them after the
fact, notwithstanding the lack of express authority.236
Indeed,
,,
acquiescence in a series of ostensibly ''unauthorized transactions
could give rise to an estoppel or, at some point, even be considered as
a species of "express" authority. That observation leads to a final
point: The ultimate issue under articles 2996 and 2997 is how
,,
"express express authority must be? It seems likely that, in contrast

to the Radio/on e approach of simply choosing to follow one Code
article rather than another, courts will seek to find an "expression" of
authority in some words or conduct of the principal which the court
can interpret in a fashion (reasonably or unreasonably)
an equitable result.

as

permitting

10. Self-Contracting
Art. 2998. Contracting with one� self
A mandatary who represents the principal

as the other contracting
party may not contract with himself unless he is authorized by the

(c) to employ, supervise, or discharge employees as the course of business
require;
.
(d) to sell or otherwise dispose of goods or other thmgs m accordance with
the purposes for which the business is operated;
(e) to receive payment of sums due the principal and to pay debts due from
the principal arising out of the business enterprise; and
(f) to direct the ordinary operations of the business.
may reasonably

Id.

236. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 1 843 (West 1 987).

.

.
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li g a duty to
merely falfiln
principal, or, in making such contract, he is
1
1
.
3
thepnnczpa
.2
.

a.

Self-Contracting Prohibited

Article 2998 states the self-evident proposition that a mandatary

may not contract with himsel£

Technically, sue

s�l f-con�a�ting
would be possible because a mandatary who acts within the lmuts of

�

his authority acts not for himself but for his principal.

Colloquially

speaking, he is wearing the principal's hat. The thrust o f the above
article is that the mandatary may not, at the same time and in the

same act, wear his own individual hat.238

As obvious

as

this

proposition may sound, it was not stated explicitly in any of the civil
codes prior provisions on mandate. Thus,

stated in the comments
3
under article 2998, "[t]his provision is new."2 9
b.

as

Exceptions

The comments also acknowledge that article 2998 "is based on"

article 235 of the Greek Civil Code, article 13 95 of the Italian Civil

Code, and section 1 8 1 of the German Civil Code.240

The words

"based on" suggest both similarities and differences from the source
provisions.
The similarities are that, like article 2998, all three
source provisions generally prohibit self-contracting as defined

above and that all three allow the equally self-evident exception for

cases in which self-contracting is authorized by the principal.241
Further, under general principles, subsequent ratification by the
principal should have the same effect as prior authorizatio n .
The differences are the following:

All three source provisions

include within the scope of the prohibition of self-contracting contracts

entered into by a person acting as the mandatary of both contracting
parties.242 In contrast, such contracts do not fall within the scope of
�cle 2998243 F�e�ore, such contracts seem to b e permitted by
article 3000.

Like article 2998, the three source provisions allow

an

237. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998 (West Supp. 1 999).
238. For situation � � which the mandatary contracts with himself
in his c apacity as
mandatary for another pnnc1pal, see infra notes 240-249 and accomp
anying text .
239. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998 cmt.
240. See id.
24 1 . The Italian Ci�i� Code requires speci fic author
ization. See ITALY c c art 1 39S
The Greek and German c1vd codes speak of acts al lowed
by the pnncipaI See § 1 8 1 BGB;
·

GREEK CIV. CODE art. 235.
242. See supra note 24 1 .
243 . See LA. Crv. CODE ANN.

·

·

·

art. 3000.

·

·

·
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exception from the principle of prohibiting self-contracting, but this
exception is phrased differently. The Greek and German civil codes
allow an exception for a juridical act which "consists exclusively in the
fulfillment of an obligation,"244 while the Italian Civil Code allows an
exception for any contract the content of which "is established in such
a way as to preclude the possibility of a conflict of interests. "245 Thus,
this part of article 2998 is closer to the Greek and German provisions
but it may differ from both of them to the extent it speaks of a "duty"
rather than an "obligation" and it specifies that the duty must be one
owed ''to the principal."246 A relevant example from the Greek
jurisprudence is a situation in which a mandatary acting in his
individual capacity pays himself (in his capacity as the principal's
mandatary) a debt owed by the mandatary to the principal, or vice
versa.247 Another example that fits the language of the Louisiana
article is a situation in which a mandatary authorized to sell perishable
goods belonging to the principal buys the goods after exhausting all
efforts to find other suitable buyers. In light of the mandatary's duty
''to fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate he has
accepted,"248 such a sale or purchase should be considered the
fulfillment of "a duty to the principal,"249 and thus should not fall
within the prohibition of self-contracting provided in article 2998.

1 1 . Capacity
ArL 2999. Person of limited capacity
A person oflimited capacity may act as

a mandatary for matters for
which he is capable of contracting. In such a case, the rights of the
principal against the mandatary are subject to the rules governing the
obligations ofpersons oflimited capacity.250
This article is based on article 300 1 of the Louisiana Civil Code
amended in 1 979.251 The source article, however, provided only
for emancipated minors, which, of course, have full contractual
capacity.252 In contrast, the new article speaks of "persons of limited
as

244. § 1 8 1 BGB. The Greek article requires further that any such self-contract which
is not clothed with the notarial form is null . See GREEK av. CODE art. 235.
245. ITALY C.c. art. 1 395. For a similar exception, see BW art. 68.

246. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2998, with ITALY C.c. art. 1 3 95, and GREEK
Crv. CODE art. 235, and § 1 8 1 BGB.
247. See Touss1s, supra note 2 1 , at 697.
248. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3001.
249. Id. art. 2998.
250. Id. art. 2999.
25 1 . See id. art. 2999 cmt. (a).
252. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 1922 (West 1987).
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as persons
capacity," which includes unemancipated minors, as well
s are
placed under limited interdiction. To the extent these person
e of
capabl
capable of contracting for thems elves they are also
.
.
serving as mandataries for another. Thus, a mmor who under article
3
1 923 is capable of entering into certain "contracts for necessaries"25
is also capable of entering into the same contracts as mandatary for

may perform all
another. Furthermore, persons of limited capacity
4
5
2
the material acts contemplated by the mandate.
12. Mandatary of Both Parties
Art. 3000. Mandatary of both parties
A person may be the mandatary of two or more parties, such as a
buyer and a seller, for the purpose of transacting one or more affairs
involving all of them. In such a case, the mandatary must disclose to
each party that he also represents the other.2 55

Article 30 1 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that
"[t]he broker or intermediary is he who is employed to negotiate a
matter between two parties, and who, for that reason, is considered as
the mandatary of both."256 The 1870 Code also contained four other
articles regulating the duties and responsibilities of brokers.25 7 These
articles have not been reproduced by the new Act because in the
2 8
meantime brokerage is regulated by special legislation. 5
The new Act does, however, sanction the concept o f what may be
colloquially called a "double agent," namely a person who, in one and
the same act, acts as the mandatary of more than one principal. Article
3000 allows such a person to act on behalf of both or all the principals
even in the same transaction and even if their respective interests are
not parallel, subj ect only to his obligation to disclose this fact to the
affected principals.259 Thus, under this article, a person may represent
both the seller and the buyer and in that capacity negotiate and
effectuate the sale of a house. Obviously, such a sale i s a species of
self-contracting, but it is not the same as the "pure" self-contracting
25 3 . See id. at 1923.
2?4. For th� question of whether a contract
that calls for the performance of
exclus1vely matenal acts can qualify as a mandate,
see supra notes 1 23 - 1 50 and
accompanying text.
255. LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 3000 (West Supp.
1 999).
256. LA. Crv. CODE art. 3016 ( 1 870) (repea
led 1 997).
257. See id. arts. 301 7-3020 (repealed 1 997).
25 8. See �A. Crv. CODE ANN art. 3000
cmt. (b) (West Supp. 1999) .
259. See id. art. 3000 "Under this prov·
ision
· , depend'mg on parti·cular
arrangements a
b k
b
datary of the buyer, of the seller,
or of both the buyer and the selle
r."
m
3
t
.

.

·

�� ��7 ���

Id.
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that is prohibited by article 2998.260 Yet, the possibility of a conflict of
interests is equally present in both situations. Recognizing this
problem, article 3017 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 required the
mandatary to "observe the same fidelity towards all parties, and not
favor one more than another."261 Although this article was not
reproduced by the new Act, the same duty of fidelity continues to exist
by virtue of new article 3001 .262
B.

The Internal Relations Between the Principal and the Mandatary

1.

In General

The methodology employed in this subpart diverges from that
of the previous parts of the Article. Rather than providing an article
by-article discussion, this subpart provides a brief summary of
articles 3001 through 3015. In addition to the space limitations of
this Review, this divergence is justified by the fact that the new
articles on internal relations do not change in any significant way the
pre-Revision law, although some matters previously unexpressed are
now expressed.263 Moreover, on a practical level, most disputes
invoking the law of mandate tend to involve the rights and liabilities
of the principal and third person, rather than principal and mandatary.
Finally, the rules expressed in articles 3001 through 301 5 are
ultimately fairly self-evident. They flow essentially from the
fiduciary nature o f the relationship itself.264 As a function thereof,
260. See id. art. 2998.
26 1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3017 (1 870) (repealed 1 997).
262. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 3001 (West Supp. 1 999).
263. Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 3001 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV CoDE
art. 3002 (1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. 3002 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3003 ( 1 870) (repealed 1997); LA. C1v. CoDE ANN. art. 3004 (West Supp.
1999), with LA. CIV. CoDE arts. 3005, 3023 (1870) (repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3005 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3015 ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. Clv.
CODE ANN. rut. 3007 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3007, 3008, 3009 (1 870)
(repealed 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 3008 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE art.
3010 (1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3009 (West Supp. 1999), with LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3014 ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3010 (West Supp.
1 999), with LA. CIV. CoDE art. 3021 (1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 301 1
(West Supp. 1999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 0 1 1 ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. CIV CoDE
ANN. art. 3012 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3022 (1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA.
CJv. CODE ANN. art. 3013 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3024 ( 1 870) (repealed
1997); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3019 (West Supp. 1 999), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3025
(1 870) (repealed 1 997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 3015 (West Supp. 1999), with LA. Clv.
CODE ANN. art. 3026 ( 1 870) (repealed 1997).
264. The fiduciary nature of the relationship has long been recognized by Louisiana
courts. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1 992); Cuggy v.
Zeller, 61 So. 209, 2 1 1 - 1 2 (La. 1913); cf REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, § 1 (1) (defining
.

.

.

.

.

agency as a fiduciary relation).
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and
the mandatary owes his principal a duty to act with due care
a
diligence, a duty of loyalty to avoid conflicts of interest, and duty to
he
hold
t?
Correspondingly, the principal has a u�
account.
mandatary harmless for actions o f the mandatary within his authonty.

�

�

Those duties are discussed below.

2.

Duties of the Mandatary to the Principal

Articles 3001 through 3009 outline the obligations of the
mandatary to the principal.
Article 3001 imposes upon the
mandatary the duty to fulfill his mandate ''with prudence and
diligence," and holds him liable to the principal for damages caused
by his failure to perform,265 although those damages may be reduced
by the court if the mandate is gratuitous.266 The duty of loyalty is not
directly imposed by the mandate articles; it is said to derive from the
general obligation of good faith.267
The mandatary likewise has a duty to provide information and to
account to the principal268 and to turn over to the principal all that he
receives pursuant to the mandate, except sufficient property to pay his
expenses.269 He owes interest on the principal's money diverted to his
own use.270
While the mandatary ordinarily must fulfill the mandate himself,
under certain unforeseen circumstances he may delegate his duties to a
substitute.271

If the act of substitution is authorized, the mandatary is

responsible for acts of the substitute only if the mandatary was

265. LA. av. CODE ANN. art. 3001 (West Supp. 1 999) ("The mandatary is bound to
fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate he has accepted. He is responsible to the
principal for the loss that the principle sustains as a result of the mandatary's failure to
perform.").
266. See id. art. 3002 ("When the mandate is gratuitous, the court may reduce the
amount of loss for which the mandatary is liable.").
267. See id. art. 3001 cmt. (b); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (West 1987).
�68. See LA. CIV. <::ooE ANN. art. 3003 (West Supp. 1999) ("At the request of the
.
pnnc1pal? or when the ctrcumstances so require, the mandatary is bound to provide
mformat1on and render an account of his performance of the mandate. The mandatary is
bound to notify t:he principal, �ithout delay, of !he fulfillment �f the mandate.").
269. See z�. art. 3004 ( 'The �dat� 1s bound to dehver to the principal everything
_
.
he rece1v �d �Y "'.trtue of t�e mandat�, mcludmg thmgs
he received unduly. The mandatary
may retam m hts poss�ss1on sufficient property of the principal to pay the mandatary's
expenses and remuneration.").
270. See �d. art. 3005 (''The mandatary owes interest, from the date used, on sums of
.
that the mandatary applies to his own use.").
money of the pnnc1pal
27 1 . See id. art. �006 ("ln the absence of contrary agreement, the mandatary is bound
to fulfill the �andate himself. Nevertheless, i f the interests of the principal so r uire when
unforeseen �rrc�ces p�event the mandatary from performing his duties and e is �nable
.
to communicate wtth the prmctpal, the mandatary may appoint a substitute.").

�
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negligent in choosing the substitute or instructing him.272
If the
substitution was unauthorized, the mandatary is automatically
responsible for the substitute's acts.273 In all cases, the principal can
pursue the substitute.274
For reasons discussed in detail later,275 the pre-Revision Code did
not address the question of the mandatary's responsibility to the
principal, as opposed to third persons, for acts exceeding the
mandatory's authority. Article 3008 now imposes liability on the
mandatary for such acts, although the principal has no such
responsibility to the mandataty unless the principal ratifies those
acts.276 Finally, consistent with the general principle that solidarity is
not presumed,277 multiple mandataries are not solidarily liable to a
common principal unless otherwise agreed.278

3.

Duties of the Principal to the Mandatary

3010 through 301 5 state the obligations owed by the
principal to the mandatary. Article 3010 now imposes an express
Articles

obligation owed by the principal to the mandatary to p erform
authorized obligations, as well as obligations contracted by the
mandatary after termination of the mandate without knowledge of
The principal is liable to the mandatary for
tennination.279
272. See id.

art.

3007.

When the mandatary is authorized to appoint a substitute, he is answerable
to the principal for the acts of the substitute only if he fails to exercise diligence in
selecting the substitute or in giving instructions.
When not authorized to appoint a substitute, the mandatary is answerable to
the principal for the acts of the substitute as if the mandatary had performed the
mandate himself.
In all cases, the principal has recourse against the substitute.
Id.

273.
274.
275.
276.

See id.

See id.
See infra notes 339-342 and accompanying text.
See LA. av. CODE ANN art. 3008 ("If the mandatary exceeds his authority, he is
.

answerable to the principal for resulting loss that the principal sustains. The principal is not
answerable to the mandatary for loss that the mandatary sustains because of acts that exceed
his authority unless the principal ratifies those acts.").
277. See id. art. 1 796 (West 1987).
278. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN art. 3009 (West Supp. 1999) ("Multiple mandataries are
not solidarily liable to their common principal, unless the mandate provides otherwise.").
.

279. See id. art. 3010.

The principal is bound to the mandatary to perform the obligations that the
mandatary contracted within the limits of his authority. The principal is also bo�d
.
to the rnandatary for obligations contracted by the mandatary after the tenrunation
of the mandate if at the time of contracting the mandatary did not know that the
mandate had terminated.
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unauthorized obligations only if he ratifies them. 2 80 In this sense, the
mandatary's acts can be "authorized" if he fulfills his duties in a
manner more advantageous to the principal than originally
81
authorized.2

The principal must reimburse the mandatary for expenses and
pay his agreed compensation, even if the purpose of the mandate was
not accomplished, so long as the failure was not the mandatary's
fault. 282 He must compensate the mandatary for losses sustained,
provided they were not caused b y the mandatary's fault,2 83 and pay
interest on amounts expended personally by the mandatary.2 84 Finally,
in contrast to the rule on multiple mandataries,2 8 5 multiple principals
are solidarily liable to their mandatary for affairs common to them.286

C.

External Relations

1.

Relations Between the Mandatary and Third Persons
Art. 3016.

Disclosed mandate and p rincipal

A mandatary who contracts in the name of the principal within the
limits of his authority does not bind himself personally for the
performance ofthe contract.287

Id.

The principal is not bo d to the mandatary
�
to perform the obligations that
the manda� �ontra�ted which exceed the
limits of the mandatary 's authority
unless the pnnc1pal ratifies those acts.

280. See id.
28 1 . See id. art. 301 1 ('The mandata
ry acts wi.thm
. the limits of his authority even
when he fulfills his duties m
· a manner more advantag
eous to the principal than was
authorized.").
282. See id. art. 3012 .
The principal is bound to reim
b rse the mandatary f r the expe
charges he has incurred and to pay .
nses and
�
h m i::e remuneration to whi
ch he is entitled.
The principal is bound to
reim
� burs and pay the man
datary even though
without the mandatary's fault
the purpose 0� the man
date
was
not
accomplished.
Id.
283 . See id. art. 30 13 ("Th
e pri nc i al is b ound to
the mandatary sustains as a
compensate the mandatary for loss
result of the andate,
but not for loss caused by
mandatary.").
the fault ofthe
284. See id art 30 14 (''Th
. .
e pnnrf1
c1pal owes interest from
sums expended by the
the date of the expenditure on
mandatary in pe orrn
ance of the mandate. ").
285. See .supra note 278
and
286. See LA. CIV CODE .h..�companying text.
�N. art. 3 01 5
("MultiPle pnncipals
them are sord
1 an·1Y bound to their
for an affair common to
mandatary. ")
287. Id. art. 3 0 1 6.

::i

·

·

·

·

·

·

·
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Undisclosed mandate

mandatary who contracts in his own name without disclosing his
status as a mandatary binds himselfpersonally for the peiformance of
the contract.288
Art. 3018.

Disclosed mandate; undisclosed principal,

mandatary who enters into a contract and discloses his status as a
mandatary, though not his principal, binds himselfpersonally for the
performance ofthe contract. The mandatary ceases to be bound when
the principal is disclosed.289
A

a.

Disclosed and Undisclosed Agency in Louisiana: A Brief
History

The general background in Louisiana of the doctrine of
''undisclosed agency," i.e., the ability of an agent to create binding
relations between his principal and third persons without disclosing
the principars existence or identity, has recently been discussed in
some detail in this Review,290 and thus only a brief survey will be
offered in this

article.

In short, common-law principles of

undisclosed agency were imported into Louisiana beginning with the
1 828 supreme court opinion in

Williams v. Wznchester,291

and for well

over a century to follow the process was unabated.292 The first bump

in the road challenging the efficacy o f that process came in the 1 947
supreme court case, Sentell v. Richardson. 293
In Sentell, the

defendant agreed to purchase stock for the plaintiff from a third
person, without disclosing his purpose, and to transfer the stock to
the plaintiff upon acquisition.294

Although the defendant was

288. Id. art. 3017.
289. Id. art. 3018.
290. See Michael B. North, Comment, Qui Facit Per Aliurn, Facit Per Se:
Representation, Mandate, and Principles ofAgency in Louisiana at the Turn of the Twenty
First Century, 72 TuL. L. REv. 279, 295-99 ( 1 997). For other extended treatments of the
issue, see Glenn G. Morris, Personal Liabilityfor Corporate Participants Without Corporate
Veil-Piercing: Louisiana Law, 54 LA. L . REv. 207, 2 1 3-25 ( 1993) [hereinafter Morris,
Personal Liability]; Fred W. Jones, Comment, Juridical Basis of Principal-Third Party
�
liability in Louisiana Undisclosed Agency Cases, 8 LA. L. REV. 409 1 948); Thomas P.
n Company, Inc:
Constructio
Doster
LeBlanc, Note, Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership v.
(1994).
1395
REV.
L.
LA.
54
,
Louisiana
in
Law
Disclosing Undisclosed Agency
291 . 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1 828).
292. For a collection of early cases, see Jones, supra note 290, at 4 1 2- 14.
293. 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1 947).
294. See id. at 853-54.
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successful in purchasing the stock, he refused to deliver it to the
plaintiff, prompting suit.295
The defendant's principal response was that he was not a
mandatary at all, basing this on former article 2985 which defined
mandate as "an act by which one person gives power to another to
transact for him and in his name, one or several affairs. "296

The

defendant argued that, because he did not act in the plaintiff's name, he
could not be his mandatary.297 Rejecting that theory, the c ourt stated:
Our opinion is that the words "and in his name" are not essential to the
definition of a procuration or power of attorney, as defined in article
2985 of the Civil Code. If those words were essential to the definition
there could be no such thing as a procuration or power o f attorney to
8
buy property for an undisclosed principal.29

Whatever one may think o f the propriety o f the

court's

conclusion, 299 Sentell appeared to b e a ringing reaffirmation of
undisclosed agency theory as a basic principle of Louisiana agency
law. In 1 983, however, the Louisiana First Circuit Court o f Appeal
challenged that proposition in Teachers ' Retirement System v.

Louisiana State Employees Retirement System.300 Noting the lack of
any reference to undisclosed agency in the Civil Code and without
even citing Sentell, the Teachers ' court utilized a civilian analysis to
deny an undisclosed principal the right to sue a third person.30 1 The
impact of Teachers ' was, however, uncertain at best.

One reason is

that the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the case on procedural
grounds, and the undisclosed agency issue was not reconsidered.302
Within a year after Teachers ', however, the First Circuit upheld an
action by a third person against an undisclosed principal. 3 0 3 Thus,
295. See id The defendant actually sold the shares to yet another person, but that
: .
.
aspect of the case is irrelevant to the undisclosed agency issue. See id. at 854.
296. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2985 ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997) (emphasis added).
297. See Sentell, 29 So. 2d at 855.
298. Id. Note how the court used the terms "procuration" and "power
of attorney" as
synonyms or mandate, a usage foreclosed by the Revision. See supra
notes 72-81 and
accompanying text.
299. For commentary, see Robert A. Pascal, Agency, 8 LA.
L. REv. 223 ' 225-26
(1948); Jana L. Grauberger, Comment, From Mere Intrusion
to General Confusio . A
and
in Louisiana, 72 TUI.. L. REv. 257, 266-68 ( 1 997);
Jones, supra n e 2
414-15 , North , supra note 290, at 296; LeBlanc, supra note
290, at 1 405-0 6.
444 So. 2d 1 93 (La Ct. App. 1 983), rev 'd on other groun
ds, 4 5 6 So. 2d 594 (La

�

M�ndate

�t ����

o.
91 84:.o

3 0 1 . See id. at 1 96-97.
302. See Teachers' Retirement Sys. v Louisi
· ·ana state Employees Retireme
nt Sys.,
456 So. 2d 594 (La 1 984).
303 . See Frank's Door & Bldg. Su Iy,
Inc. v. Double H Constr. Co., 4 5 9
PP
So. 2d 1 273
(La Ct. App. 1 984).
·

·
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one might have reasonably concluded that Teachers ' was an
aberration, a one-time blip on a radar screen.
However, one who did so would have been wrong, because in
1992, Teachers ' rose, phoenix-like, from its ashes, as the First Circuit

again relied upon it to deny an undisclosed principal the right to sue a
third person.304 This time, though, the supreme court granted writs,
and the resulting opinion,

Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership

v.

Doster Constroction Co. , unequivocally reaffirmed that undisclosed
agency was part of the fabric of Louisiana's law of mandate, based not

upon the Civil Code but rather as an importation from the common
law.305 Indeed, on that point the court could hardly have been more
blunt; Justice Lemmon stated:
The Civil Code has never fully developed the concept of agency and

representation with respect to the direct acquisition of rights and
liabilities through the contractual action of a properly authorized

intennediary who may or may not disclose his representative capacity.

However, Louisiana courts, perhaps recognizing that agency

of commercial law should be

as

a field

uniform throughout the country, have

adopted notions of common law agency.
We restate approval of the

use

of common law agency notions in

commercial transactions. In matters of commercial law, Louisiana has
frequently taken steps to make our law uniform with other states.306

While the breadth of Justice L emmon's declaration has been
criticized,307 the Revision affirms Woodlawn Park by explicitly
providing for undisclosed agency as part of Louisiana's positive
law.308 However, if Justice Lemmon's true desire was complete
uniformity between Louisiana mandate law and common law, this
purpose has not been fully achieved. For, as discussed below, some
differences continue to exist.
b.

Disclosed and Undisclosed Principals in the Revision

Article 3016 now specifically relieves the mandatary from any
liability to the person with whom he deals so long as the mandatary
(1) identifies his principal and (2) does not exceed his authority.309 In
essence' this is what the common law refers to as an agent for a
304. See Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 602 So. 2d 1 029 (La.
Ct. App. 1 992), rev 'd, 623 So. 2d 645 (La. 1 993).
305. 623 So. 2d 645, 647-48 (La 1993).
306. Id. at 647-48 (citations omitted).
307. See, e.g. , North, supra note 290, at 296-99.
308. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3017-3 0 1 8.
309. See id. art. 3 0 1 6 cmt. (b).
·
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"disclosed" (sometimes fully disclosed) principal: the thi�d pe�son at
the time of the transaction has notice both that the agent is actmg for
a principal and the principal's identity.31°
Consistent with the
common law, such a mandatary does not become a party to the
contract, subject, of course, to any contrary agreement with those

with whom he deals. 311
Conversely, under article 301 7, a mandatary, who discloses
neither the principal's identity nor that he is acting for a principal, is a

party to the contract-what the common law calls an agent for an
''undisclosed" principal.312 Article 3 0 1 7 is likewise consistent with the
common law31 3 as well as the pre-Revision jurisprudence.314
In each of the above cases, the result flows from simple objective
contract theory. When the principal is disclosed, the person dealing
with the mandatary could reasonably understand that he is contracting
only with the principal, and that would be his intent, absent some clear
expression by the mandatary that he likewise promises performance of
the obligation.315 On the other hand, when the principal is completely
undisclosed, because there has been no manifestation o f assent by the
principal, the third person would obviously expect the liability of the
mandatary, the only person of whose existence he is aware.3 16
c.

Partially Disclosed Principals Under the Revision

Article 301 8 deals with what the common law refers to as an
agent for a partially disclosed principal:317 the mandatary discloses
that he is representing someone, but not who the "someone" is. 31 8
Article 301 8 :idopts a rule somewhat more complex than the two
.
precedmg articles: such a mandatary is initially bound for the
�ce of the c�n act, ut is released from liability upon
?erfo:rn
1dent1fication of the pnnc1pal. 3 1
This is a rather peculiar rule, one

�

�

·

3 10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94 ' § 4 ( I )
3 1 1 . See id. § 320.
3 1 2. See id. § 4 (3).
3 1 3 . See id. § 322.
3 14. See, e.g., Chappuis & Chappuis v Ka Ian
1 129 So. 1 56, 1 57-58 (La. 1 930); C.T.
Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors In
580 So. 2d 525, 528 (La Ct. App.
'
1991); Dash Bldg. Materials Ctr., Inc. v. He
g,
o. 2d 653, 656 (La Ct. App. 1990);
Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H
Co. , 459 So. 2d 1 273, l 275-77 (La.
Ct. App. 1 984). See genera/ly Morris Perso a za
I tty, supra note 290,
at 2 1 3- 1 7.
3 1 5. See RESTATEMENT' supra �ote I 9 ' § 320
cmt. (a); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3016
cmt. (c) (West Supp. 1 999).
3 1 6. See RESTATEMENT supra note 1 94' §
'
l S6 cmts. (a)-(b); id. § 322.
3 1 7. See id. § 4 (2).
3 1 8. See LA. Crv CODE ANN art. 3 0 l
8 (West Supp. 1 999).
3 1 9. See id.
·

f��e�
'

��
� i°L'0��1!·

·

·
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which differs both from the common law and the pre-Revision
jurisprudence, and may represent one of the least successful choices
made in the Revision.
As to the common law, the general rule is that an agent for a
partially disclosed principal becomes a party to contracts he makes,
absent some contrary agreement by the person with whom he deals.320
The rationale underlying the rule is, once again, one of obj ective
contract theory. Here, in contrast to complete nondisclosure cases, the

third person is aware that there is someone "lurking in the
background" who at some point will preswnably emerge. But few
people would put their complete trust in the creditworthiness of an
unidentified person. Thus, the most plausible ordinary interpretation
would be that the third person would nnderstand that the agent, whose
identity he does know and whose creditworthiness is subject to
evaluation, is at least a co-obligor on the contract.321 On the other
hand, under the common-law approach, there is clearly no mechanism
for automatic absolution of the agent by the simple act of disclosure.
Rather, the agent remains a co-obligor or surety for the principal even
after the principal steps forward, absent, of course, some specific
But the
agreement by the parties for the agent's release. 322
Restatement clearly treats this as the exception to the generally
assumed intentions of the parties.
Before the Revision, Louisiana jurisprudence failed to distinguish
between undisclosed and partially-disclosed agency. Generally, the
courts imposed personal liability on the agent for inadequately
disclosing his principal,323 whether the agent failed completely to
disclose that he was acting as an agent,324 or simply failed, in some
way, to adequately identify his principal.325 At the same time, while
320. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 3 2 1 .
321. See id. § 3 2 1 cmt. (a). In the words of the Restatement:
The inference of an understanding that the agent is a party to the contract exists
unless the agent gives such complete information concerning his principal's
identity that he can be readily distinguished. If the other party has no reason�le
means of ascertaining the principal, the inference is almost irresistible and prevails
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Id.
322. See id. § 3 2 1 cmt. (b); id. § 336 cmt. (d).
.
323. For a collection of cases and discussion of pre-Revision law, see Moms,
Personal Liability, supra note 290, at 219-25.
324. See, e.g. , Black Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Koehl & Assocs., Inc., 571 So. 2d 902,
904-905 (La. Ct. App. I 990); Travis v. Hudnall, 5 1 7 So. 2d 1085, 1 089-90 (La. Ct. App.
1 987).
1988)�
325. See, e.g. , Wilkinson v. Sweeney, 532 So. 2d 243, 246-48 (La Ct. App.
Centanni
988);
1
App.
Ct.
(La.
462-63
,
461
2d
So.
520
Gravois,
v.
You'll See Seafoods, Inc.
v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 258 So. 2d 2 19, 221-22 (La. a . App. 1 972).
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not distinguishing the concepts, the courts rea�hed �esults that were
consistent with the ordinary common-law rules JUSt discussed: Agents
for either undisclosed or partially disclosed principals were generally

held personally liable, absent contrary agreem�t.326

By distinguishing the concepts of undisclosed from partially
.
disclosed agency, the Revision brings about a cosm�tic change to the
•

jurisprudence. More importantly, howe�er, b� allo�g th� manda�ary
.
to terminate his liability merely by disclosmg his pnnc1pal, article

301 8

not

only

brings

about

a

substantive

change

from

the

jurisprudential regime but also deviates from the practice of common
law states by adopting a rule unique to Louisiana.

Of course
uniqueness is not necessarily a vice; in this case, however, it may be of
dubious merit.

It may well be that both the change and the deviation are

unintended.

Because the

comments

to

article

301 8

do

not

acknowledge that the article changes the jurisprudence,327 it is difficult

to hypothesize about the intent of the article.

It may be that the

drafters believed that when a mandatary acts for a partially disclosed

principal, the ordinary intention of the parties would be that virtually

all risks of the transaction should be borne by the third person, rather
than by the mandatary. However,

as

explained above, such a belief is

inconsistent with the assumptions adopted by the common law of our
sister states . 328 Thus, if the drafters' intent was to bring Louisiana law
closer to the common law on this i s sue, this intent has not been carried

out.

More importantly, though, by creating an essentially risk-free
scenario for the mandatary, article 301 8 may be an invitation to
opportunistic behavior. Suppose, for example, that Mandatary fonns

two corporations : ABC Corporation, which is solidly financed, and
XYZ Corporation, which is nominally financed.
Mandatary then

��

con�acts with
Pers�n, dis�losing that he is acting as a mandatary
for a corporation. The mcentives thereby created are obvious: if
the
deal pans out, identify
Corporation as the "princ ipal;" if it does
.
not, identify XYZ Corporation and leave Third Person
as the holder of
the proverbial bag. It is just this sort of opportunism that
the common
law rule avoids.
<?f course, our co� may find ways of polic
ing truly outrageous
behaVIor. For example, m the abov e hypotheti
cal, the Mandatary may

AB�

326.
327.
328.

See cases cited supra notes 324-3 25.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. �· 3018 cmts. (We
st Supp.
See supra text accompanymg notes 320-322.

1999).

1999]

A KOMMENTAR ON LO UISIANA 'S NEW LA W

1 1 45

still face liability under a corporate

veil-piercing theory as

shareholder,

mandataty,

as opposed to a mere

assuming

a

that

appropriate facts are established to justify such a result.329
Nonetheless, this aspect of article 3 0 1 8 seems an apt topic for
reconsideration.

Art. 3019.

Liability when authority is exceeded

A mandatary who exceeds his authority is personally bound to the
third person with whom he contracts, unless that person knew at the
time the contract was made that the mandatary had exceeded his
330
authority or unless the principal ratifies the contract.

d.

Consequences of"Exceeding" One's Authority: A

Historical Background

The rule announced in article 3 0 1 9 is one of deceptive
simplicity:
as a counterpart to article 3008, which makes the
mandataty "answerable" to his principal for losses sustained as a
result of acts exceeding the mandatary's authority,331 article 3019
"personally binds" him to the third person for such acts, absent
knowledge that the mandatary exceeded his authority or ratification

by the principal. 332 In fact, though, there is much more to this issue

than meets the eye, requiring some background discussion of the
common law, the old Code, and the jurisprudence.

At common law, the situation is relatively simple. An agent has a
duty to his principal not to act "except in accordance with the
principal's manifestation of consent."333 Likewise, absent an effective
disclaimer, an agent makes an implied warranty of his authority to
persons with whom he deals. 334 Accordingly, an agent who acts in
excess of his authority may be liable for damages suffered either by
the principal335 or the third person336 as a result of his actions.337 In

329. See generally Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA.
L. REv. 271 (199 1 ) [hereinafter Morris, Piercing the �ii].
330. LA. CIV. CODE .ANN. art. 3019.
33 1 . See id. art. 3008. For discussion, see supra text accompanying note 276.
332. See id. art. 3 0 1 9.
333. REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 383.
334. See id. § 329. The implied warranty does not arise if a third person knows that
the agent lacks authority. See id.
335. See id. §§ 383, 399-40 1 .
336. See id. § 329.
.
.
,
he ts.
337. It has been observed that the nature of the agent s hab1hty ts alternative;
.

.

.

.

liable either to the principal or third person, but not �oth. The ra?o�ale is that,. on the one
hand, the agent may have exceeded his actual authonty, but the pnnc1pal may sttll be _bo�ald
because of the agent' s apparent authority or inherent agency power. In that case, the pnnc1p
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addition, an agent who tortiously misrepresents his authority can be
.
held liable in tort for detrimental reliance on the misrepresentation.338
The Louisiana Civil Code never directly addressed the liability of
a mandatary to his principal for acts exceeding his authority, for the
very simple reason that former articles 3 0 1 0 and 302 1 stated that such
acts could

never

bind the principal at all. 339 Thus, because the code

effectively negated such common-law concepts
as apparent
authority,340 there was no need in theory for a positive rule making the
mandatary accountable to his principal for such acts.

But the reality

was, of course, quite different, because as discussed below, Louisiana
courts

imported

jurisprudence,341

common-law

apparent

authority

into

our

and correspondingly courts furnished a rule of

liability essentially the same as at common law.342 This aspect of the
mandatary's liability is now covered by article 3008. 343
With regard to the mandatary's liability to third persons, though,
the Code always had express rules, and those should be considered in
comparison to article 301 9.

The three operative provisions were

former articles 3010, 3012, and 3 0 1 3 . Article 3 0 1 0 provided: ''The
attorney can not go beyond the limits o f his procuration; whatever he
does exceeding his power is null and void with regard to the principal,
unless ratified by the latter, and the attorney alone is bound by it in his
individual capacity."344 Article 3 0 1 2 provided: 'The mandatary, who
has communicated his authority to a person with whom he contracts in

becomes a party to the contract, and thus the third person has no loss. The principal'
however, has an action against the agent for breach of duty.
?n the other hand, if the agent had no power to bind the principal on any theory, then
the thrrd person has suffer� �e loss �f at least his expectation and can recover damages from
the agent, although the pnnc1pal obvtously suffers no loss. See Morris, Personal Liability,
supra note 290, at 23 1 n.92. The sparse case law in Louisiana appears to follow this
approach. �ee Ite� Co. v. �a �lac� C?-arnber of Commerce, 1 6 So. 2d 567, 572 (La Ct. App.
! 944) (stating that 1fthe pnnc1pal ts liable, the unauthorized agent cannot be liable unless he
1s a personal guarantor).
338. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 3 30.
339. See LA. CIV. CoDE art. 30 1 0 ( 1 870) (repealed 1 997)
("The attomey can not go
.
· of h1· � procuration;
beyond the rmuts
�hatever he does exceeding his power is null and void
.
_
�� r�g�. to the pnn�1p!!1, unless ratified by the latter, and the attome is alone bound y it
b
m his md1V1dual capacity. ) ; id. art. 3021 (repealed 1 997) (''The pnnc1pa
· · YI 1s bound to execute
nts co�tract by the attorney, conformably to the
th �gag
power confided to him For
er he 1s not und, except in so far as he has
an mg
expressly ratified it ")
340. See John D. Wogan ' Comment' Agency n
·
rower In
· Louisiana, 40· TuL.
L. REV.
l l O, 123-24 ( 1 965).

� =
341 .

42.
cases .
343.
344.

�

�

·

See infra � otes 375-3 81 and accompany
ing text.
See Moms, Personal Liability, supr
a note 290, at 232_ 33, 2 3 7 nn.
1 1 7_2 1
See LA.

av. CODE AN.N art. 300 8 (West Sup
p 1 999
LA. Crv. CODE AN.N art. 30 1 0 ( 1 870
) (repealed 199

�..

(citing
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that capacity, is not answerable to the latter for anything done beyond
i� unl� he has entered into a personal guarantee."345 Article 3 0 1 3
provided: 'The mandatary is responsible to those with whom he
contracts, only when he has bound himself personally, or when he has
exceeded his authority without having exhibited his powers."346
At least two ambiguities existed with regard to the above articles.
The first, and perhaps more important, was the conceptual basis for the
mandatary's liability to third persons. Article 3010 stated that he was
''bound" in his individual capacity. While this could be read literally
as making the mandatary a party to the contract he made as a substitute
for the principal, that would be an unfortunate interpretation of the law.
As previously noted,347 the common law premises liability on an
implied warranty theory, and clearly rejects the idea that the agent
becomes a party to the contract.348 This is a sensible rule firmly
grounded in objective contract theory, for if the agent became a party
to the contract, then he would obtain the right to enforce it against the
third person or, indeed, to assign his rights in the contract to others,
subject to normal contract principles limiting assignability. Such a
result would, however, clearly be inconsistent with the intentions of
the third person, who understood himself to be contracting only with
the principal through the actions of the agent.
Thus, properly understood, the former article 30 1 0 should have

"bound" the mandatary only in the sense of making him answerable in

damages suffered by the third person for breach of what is effectively
a warranty of authority, a view which Planiol endorsed.349
Unfortunately, while some of the pre-Revision opinions apply terms
consistent with the idea that a mandatary who exceeds his authority
may have become a party to the contract,350 no Louisiana case has
considered authoritatively the true theoretical basis for the mandatary's
liability.351

345. Id. art. 3012 (repealed 1997).
346. Id. art. 30 1 3 (repealed 1997).
347. See supra text accompanying note 336.
.
common
348. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 329. cmt. . The one except.ton at
law arises from an unauthorized signature on a negotiable mstrument. See id: ; U.C: C. § �m
403(a) (providing unauthorized signature effective as signanu:e of unauthonzed signer.
favor of person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes 1t for value). That exception
1 993).
applies in Louisiana as well. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN . § l0:3-403(a) (West
2256.
020,
1
§§
32,
note
.
supra
T
R.IPER
&
349. See 2 PLANIOL
(La Ct. App. 1 939) (statmg a
Vordenbaumen' v. Gray, 1 89 So. 342, 348
350 s
the contract
� ;eds his authority "is personally bound to fulfill the terms of
w
made").
· · prudence, see Morris,
· ·on Juns
pre-Rev1s1
3 5 1 . For a thorough discussion of the
Personal Liability, supra note 290, at 237-44 .

man� �� = �
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A

second

question

involved

effect

the

of

the

words

"communicated his authority" and "exhibited his powers" in fonner
articles 301 2 and 3013, respectively.
As one commentator has
observed, the thrust of those provisions created exceptions to the
general rule of liability in article 30 10: In effect, if the mandatary has

"communicated his authority" or "exhibited his powers," then the third

person is responsible for interpreting that communication; if he
construes the grant of authority from the principal too broadly, then he,
not the mandatary, bears the risk. 352 The end result is much the same
as at common law:

the agent who is silent impliedly warrants his

authority and is liable without regard to fault if he exceeds it.

Yet
liability is avoided if the agent makes it clear that he makes no such
warranty or if the third person knows he is unauthorized. 353
Narrowly read, however, articles 301 2 and 30 1 3 could have

suggested that any exculpatory communication had to come from the
mandatary himself; the articles were silent as to information acquired

by the third person from other sources.354 Logically, there is no reason
to distinguish between information derived from the mandatary and
infonnation derived from other sources. In either case, the ultimate
under all the
question is one of objective contract theory:
circumstances, should the third person have understood that the
mandatary was making his ordinary warranty of authority, or should
he have understood that sufficient questions existed as to the
mandatary's authority that the third person was essentially proceeding
at his own risk?355 Unfortunately, the existing cases never really
addressed this issue per se.
One commentator surveying the
jurisprudence concluded that, ultimately, the results in the reported

cases support the view that, consistent with the common law the
'
source of information with regard to the mandatary's lack o f authority

was irrelevant.356
e.

Article 3019 Compared

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, several obser
vations

can be made about the new articl e 3 0 1 9 . First, the new
article states
that t e mandatary exceeding his authority is "pers
onally bound to
.
the third person with
whom he contracts "357 This Ian
guage is, i· r

�

·

·

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357 .

See id. at 234.
See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § § 329,
331.
See LA. �IV. CODE arts. 3012, 3 0 1 3 ( 1 870)
(repealed 1 997) .
See �oms, Personal Lia�ility, supra note
290, at 235- 36.
See id. at 236 -42 (observing that this was
Planiol's view).
LA. CIV. CODE AN.N art. 3019 (West Supp
. 1 999).
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more

susceptible

than

its

predecessor

1 1 49
to

the

interpretation that the mandatary actually becomes a party to the
contract. Unfortunately, the comments under the article do not shed
light on the conceptual basis for liability.358

For reasons previously

expressed, it is submitted that courts should reject this interpretation

and

should conceptualize liability under article 30 1 9 in warranty

tenns.
Article 301 9, however, seems clearly to embrace the view that
the sow-ce of information involving a mandatary's lack of authority is
irrelevant; liability is avoided if the third person "knew" that the acts
exceeded the mandatary's authority, without reference to how he
knows those facts.359
In that sense, the failure to mention
communication by the mandatary is a salutary change.

In another sense, however, the elimination of the "communicated
his authority" and "exhibited his powers" language in former articles
3012 and 30 1 3 may have an undesirable effect. As previously
discussed, the basic thrust of those provisions seemed to be that if the

mandatary "communicated" or
regarding his authority to the

"exhibited" appropriate information

third person, and the latter either
misinterpreted or even ignored it, then he did so at his own risk. By
eliminating that language and adopting the rule that the mandatary
avoids liability only if the third person "knew" that the mandatary
exceeded his authority, article 3 0 1 9 may substantially narrow the
circumstances under which liability would be avoided.
The key question, of course, is the interpretation of the word
"knew." The Civil Code offers no definition of the word, but in the
Louisiana commercial laws, to "know" or "have knowledge" is
narrowly defined as "actual knowledge" of a fact. 360 By contrast, one
has ''notice" of a fact when one "has actual knowledge" of it, "has
received a notice or notification of it," or "from all the facts and
circumstances known to hitn at the time in question he has reason to

know that it exists."361 If article 301 9 was meant to adopt an actual
knowledge test, then the drafters chose an inappropriate stan�d. The
courts should interpret the word "knew" broadly so as to achieve the
doctrinally proper result. In other words , the mandatary should not be
liable if the third person either knew, or from all the facts �d
circumstances had reason to know, that the mandatary exceeded his

�

:

y former article
358. See id. art. 3 0 1 9 cmt. Indeed, the comment odd y. does not identi
301 0 as a source provision, only article 3 0 1 3 and Quebec CIVIi Code art. 2 1 5
3 59. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN art. 3019.
360. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 1 0: 1 -201 (25) (West Supp. 1 999).
·

.

.

36 1 . Id.
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authority.

If, on the other hand, courts construe

�cle

3 019

as

applicable only in cases of actual knowledge, then the article should be
amended to adopt a broader, more obj ective rule.
. .
.
Finally, article 3019 is consistent with pre-Revis10n law m

restating in its final proviso, the self-evident proposition that the
mandatary is also relieved of liability if the principal ratifies the
62
contract. 3
2.

Relations Between the Principal and Third Persons
Art. 3020. Obligations oftheprincipal to third persons
The principal is bound to peiform the contract that the mandatary,
363
acting within the limits ofhis authority, makes with a thirdperson.

Article 3020 restates a self-evident rule: a principal is liable for
the authorized acts of his mandatary. "Authority" in article 3020 is
6

4
The mandatary's
used in the same sense as in the Restatement: 3
actual authority, either express or implied.365 Like article 3021, the
black-letter rules of the Restatement refer to "authority" without any
qualifying adj ectives, but in court opinions, including the Louisiana

jurisprudence, the usage "actual authority, either expres s or implied"
66
is common. 3
Of course the central factual determination in applying the
principle of article 3020 is the scope of the mandatary's actual

authority. The process by which that determination is made can be
described easily: it is simply a matter of contract interpretation. The
Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized a rule essentially the same as
the common-law rule,367 that subject to requirements of form,368
authority is created ''by written or spoken words or other conduct of

362. See LA. CIV. CooE ANN. art. 3019. In that regard it is important to remember that
ratification can take place either by the principal 's expression or tacitly by his knowing
acceptance of the benefits of the contract. See LA . av. CODE ANN . art. 1 843 (West 1 9 87).
363. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3020 (West Supp. 1 999).
364 . See REsr'.'TEMENr, sup�a �ote 1 94, § 7 ("Authority is the power of the agent
to
affect the legal relations of the pnnc1pal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's
manifestations of consent to him.").
365. Id. § 7 cmt. (c); see also REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note
1 80, § 14; SEAVY,
supra note 194, § 8 .
366. E.g. , Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2 d 1 , 3 (La. 1987); Broadw
ay v. All-Star Ins.
Corp., 285 So' 2d 536, 538 (La 19�3); State v. Perea, 628 So. 2d
149, 1 5 1 (La. a. App.
.
1993); AAA Tire & Export, Inc. v. Big Chief Truck Lines Inc.
'
' 385 So. 2d 426 ' 429 (La Ct.
App. 1980).
367 . . See, e.g. , Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So.
2d 960, 963-64 (La 1 989)·
'
Boulos, 503 So. 2d at 7; Broadway, 285 So. 2d at 538·
Interstate Elec . Co v Frank Adams
.
Elec. Co., 136 So. 283, 285 (La 193 1 )· AAA Tire 3 g
.
5 So . 2d at 429, see a lso supra text
accompanying note 220 (quoting AAA Tire).
368. See supra text acp
com anying notes 1 77-207.
.

.

•

•

·
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the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe

that the principal desires him so to act on the principal's account."369
As the AAA Tire case previously quoted so well stated, the existence of
authority therefore turns on the question of whether the agent
reasonably believed that his acts were authorized. 370 The perspective
of those with whom he deals is not relevant to that inquiry.371
It is likewise now clear under article 3020, as at common law,372

that the rule applies regardless of whether the principal is disclosed,

partially disclosed, or undisclosed.

So long

as

the mandatary acts

within his authority, the principal is bound regardless of the degree of
disclosure by the mandatary.373
Art. 3021.

Putative mandaJary

One who causes a third person to believe that another person is his
mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts
314
with the putative mandatary.
a.

Putative Mandate and Apparent Authority: Old Wme in a
New Bottle

The recognition of the apparent authority doctrine in Louisiana
has been discussed recently in this Review.375 Suffice it to recall that
two articles of the pre-Revision Code categorically proclaimed that a
principal would never be bound by acts of a mandatary exceeding his
authority.376 Literally speaking, therefore, not only was there no
codal foundation for an "apparent" agency theory, but there was
indeed a very specific negation of the doctrine. The response of
Louisiana courts to those articles of the old Code was, however,
simple: they ignored them entirely. In an apparent concession to the
necessity to protect the stability of transactions and the reasonable

REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 26.
See AAA nre, 3 85 So. 2d at 429.
See id.
See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, §§ 144, 1 86; REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra
note 180, § 95; SEAVY, supra note 194, § 56.
373. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3020 cmt. (b) (West Supp. 1 999).
374. Id. art. 302 1 .
375. See North, supra note 290, at 299-305.
.
mandatary .�
376. Specifically, former article 3010 provided. th.at acts exceed1?g the
the latter,
by
ratified
unless
l,
authority were "null and void with regard to the pnnc1pa
Articl
997)
1
(repealed
870)
(1
0
� .3021
1
30
art.
CooE
binding the mandatary alone. LA. Ctv.
:
l ts not
stated that for any act that did not conform to the mandatary's power, the pnnc1pa
bound, except in so far as he has expressly ratified it." Id. art. 3021 (repealed 1997).
369.

370.
37 1 .
372.

,
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expectations of third persons, the jurisprudence instead imported the
common-law theory of apparent authority wholesale.377
Apparent authority is defined by the Restatement as ''the power
to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in
accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons."378

As opposed to authority in its strict sense, which depends upon the

reasonable interpretations by the agent of the conduct of the principal,
apparent authority is created ''by written or spoken words or any other
conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third
person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his
behalf by the person purporting to act for him."379 It may apply when

the agent exceeds his authority or was not really an agent at all. An
excellent description of the concept was given by the court in the AAA
Tzre opinion:

The concept of apparent authority only comes into play when the
agent has acted beyond his actual authority and has no permission
whatsoever from his principal to act in such a manner. The principal
will be bound for such actions if he has put his agent in such a position

or has acted in such a manner as to give an innocent third person the
reasonable belief that the agent has authority to act for the principal.

The facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to
determine the reasonableness of the third party's belief. One must look
from the viewpoint of the third person to detennine whether an
apparent

agency

has been

created.

In

transactions

between

377. See, e.g., Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Able Moving & Storage Co., 650 So. 2d
750, 752-53 (La 1 995); Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 963-64 (La 1 989)·
Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d I, 3 (La. 1 987); Broadway v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 285 So. 2
536, 538 (La. 1 973); Herbert v. Langhoff, 1 68 So. 508, 5 1 0- 1 1 (La 1 936); Interstate Elec.
Co. �- Frank Adams Elec. Co., 136 So. 283, 285 (La 1 93 1 ); Genina Marine Servs., Inc. v.
Mobil Exploration & Prod. Southeast, Inc. 506 So. 2d 922, 927-29 (La. Ct. App. 1 987)·' AAA
Tire & Export, In�. v. Big Chief Truck Lines, Inc., 3 85 So. 2d 426, 429 (La. Ct. App. 1 980);
Agnew v. Mu leni:c- , 1 1 So. 2d 106, 107-1 08 (La Ct. App. 1 942). See generally Wendell H.
Holm�s, umma�1ons on In ��dent Fire Insurance Co. v. Able Moving and Storage Co.:
_
Prmc1pa/
s Vicarious Tort Lzab1/1ty for Negligent A cts of an Agents Servant, 56 LA. L. REv.
571 (1 996); North, supra note 290, at 299-305 ; Wogan, supra note 340, at 1 1 2-3 0.
378. REsTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 8.
379. Id. § 27. According to the comments to the Restatement, the ·
m fiorma..;
1
..on re1·ed
.
upon by the th"ITd person can come rrec�ly from the principal, from authori
zed statements of
_
the agent, from documents or other md1c1a of authority mven to the age
· · al, or
o•
nt by the pnnc1p
.
.
even from other thiTd persons who received mform
ation as to the agent's authority from
.
.
auth�nzed or �rnutted channels. Indeed, apparent authority can be
created b y the principal's
acqu�escence m acts of the agent that stablish a community reputat
�
ion for h avm auth �n�,
�
and m some cases by the mere appointment of the agent
t0 a post. ti.on th at carnes with 1t
certain wt"deIy recogn ized duttes, such as a mana
ger or treasurer. See id. § 27 cmt. (a) .

d

�

�

�

�

·

·

·
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businessmen, the nature of the business and the customs and the usages
within the trade can be important factors to be considered.380
While the one-sentence commentary to article 302 1 makes no
reference to the point,381 it seems beyond peradventure that article
3021 was intended to provide a civilian-minted analogue to the

jurisprudentially adopted common-law concept of apparent authority.
The strength of this analogy remains to be seen.
b.

Putative Mandate: New Concept, New Questions; "Good

Faith"

The text of article 3021 raises at least two questions as to its

reach. First, it states that it imposes contractual liability on a person

whose actions cause a third person to believe that someone is the
person's agent, provided the third person contracts with the putative

mandatary "in good faith."382

Obviously, the key question is what
"good faith" means in this context.
As previously noted, the

Restatement applies apparent authority o n the basis of the third
person's reasonable belief in the agent's authority, based on the
manifestations made by the principal. 383
In this regard,
reasonableness is an obj ective standard. As the comments to the
Restatement indicate, apparent authority requires that the third person
have both an actual and reasonable belief i n the agent 's authority.384
If an individual has an actual, but wrreasonable, subj ective belief
then apparent authority is not created. As the quoted passage from
the AAA Tzre opinion demonstrates, many Louisiana courts have
recognized the reasonableness of the third person's belief as a
necessary element of apparent authority. 385

Thus, the crucial issue is whether "good faith" in article 302 1 is

to be interpreted obj ectively or subj ectively.

The one-sentence

comment wider article 3021 is, of course, as silent on this question as
it is on any other of the many questions that might arise under this
article.386 It may well be that the drafters thought it unnecessary to

380. AAA Tire, 385 So. 2d at 429.
38 1 . The comment says only that the article is new and is based on article 2 1 63 of �e
Quebec Civil Code. Nothing is said about the Louisiana jurisprudence on apparent authonty.
See LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 3021 cmt. (West Supp. 1 999).
382. See id.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 378-379.
384. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 8 cmt. (c).
385. See, e.g., Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1 , 3-4 (La. 1 987) (refusmg to �ply the
apparent authority doctrine because the third persons could not have reasonably beheved the
alleged "agent" was authorized).
386. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN . art. 3021 cmt. (West Supp. 1999).
.
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address the question of good faith because that term is supposed to
have a well-defined and well-understood meaning in the Louisiana
Civil Code. However, this question deserves more attention than it
received from the drafters for two reasons.
First, because the law of mandate overlaps with commercial law,
there is an understandable tendency to superimpose on the former
It so happens that in the area of

tenns borrowed from the latter.

commercial law, good faith is defined in subjective terms. 387 Second,
even within the Civil Code there

are

different definitions o f good faith

for different purposes.388 For example, Civil Code article

487 provides

that "UJor purposes ofaccession, a possessor is in good faith when he
. . . does not know of any defects in his ownership."389 On the other
hand, Civil Code article

3480

provides that

"UJor purposes of

acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in good faith
reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations,

when he
that he is

[the] owner . . . . "390 The latter article makes it clear that two elements
are necessary for a person to be in good faith:

(1) that

a person must

have a subjective belief that a certain state of affairs exists and

(2)

that

person's belief must reasonable by objective standards. If either one of
these elements is missing, there cannot be good faith.391
For a variety of reasons, the latter definition, which requires an
objective test, should be adopted for purposes of interpreting article

3021. Among these reasons are the fact that this has been the position
of pre-Revision jurisprudence on mandate, the fact that 3480 is the
more recent and more complete expression of legislative will on the
meaning of good faith, and the fact that the obj ective test is the one
followed in the common law states.
c.

Putative Mandate anti Agency by Estoppel

A second questi �n raised by article 3021 is its effect, if any, on
the status of the doctrine of "agency by estoppel" in Louisiana.392 Jn

387 . See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1 0: 1 -20 1 ( 1 9) (West 1993) (defining
good faith as
.
"honesty m fact").
388. No�e that this discussion relates to good faith in the sense
of belief in a fact, as
opposed to duties of perfonnance ' which are governed by other part
·
s of Louis1ana
Iaw. see,
e.g. , LA. cIV. cODE ANN. arts. 1983, 1 996- 1 997 (West 1 987)·' LA n�y ST···:r A -�·
. 1't
"'
"'-!'IN. § 1 0: 1
203 (West 1993).
389. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 487 (West 1 980) (emphasis
added)
390. LA. Crv. CODE �. �- 3480 (West 1 994) (emp
hasis added).
39 1 . For an extensive discussion of these el
·
ements, see Symeon Symeomdes,
Property, 47 LA. L. REv. 429, 429-44 (1 986).
392. For additional background on th"is question,
see Holmes, supra note 377, at 57679.
·

•

·

•

•
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the older common law, differences of opinion existed as t o whether
apparent authority was conceptually founded on an obj ective contract
theory or an estoppel theory requiring change of position.393 In the
Restatement, however, the objective theocy prevailed, and agency by
estoppel was defined separately in Section 8B.394

As the commentary to the Restatement makes clear, while
superficial similarities may exist between the two theories, apparent
authority and agency by estoppel are conceptually distinct. Agency by
estoppel is fundamentally a tort theocy, arising as a result of a
misrepresentation or, in some circwnstances, a failure to reveal
facts.395 It requires a change of position, however, to trigger liability,
and compensates the third person only to the extent of his loss, defined
as 'l>ayment of money, expenditure of labor, suffering a loss or
subjection to legal liability."396

Apparent authority, as previously

described, creates a contract binding upon the principal immediately

upon offer and acceptance, without regard to fault or change of

position.397

As to the Louisiana jurisprudence, however, confusion with
regard to the two concepts reigned until relatively recently. An early

393. See generally REuSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 180, § 23; SEAVY, supra note
1 94, § 8; Wogan, supra note 340, at I I2-16. As these authorities suggest, it is easy to see

how confusion about the doctrine arose. Both apparent authority and estoppel are based upon
outward expressions of the principal and the reasonable interpretations thereof by a third
person. In addition, in many cases involving apparent authority, the third person may have
suffered a detrimental change of position. Thus, the two are frequently intertwined in the
case law.

394. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 194, § SB.
(l) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a transaction purported to be
done on his account, is nevertheless subject to liability to persons who have
changed their positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into
by or for him, if
(a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or
(b) knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the fact�.
(2) An owner of property who represents to third persons that anothe: 1s the o�er
of the property or who permits the other so to represent, or who realizes that th�rd
persons believe that another is the owner of the property, and that he could �astly
infonn the third persons of the facts, is subject to the loss of the property tf the
other disposes of it to third persons who, in ignorance of �e facts, purchase the
property or otherwise change their position with reference to 1t.
.
(3) Change of position, as the phrase is used in the r�atement of tht� s�bJect,
to
indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor, suffenng a loss or subjection
•

legal liability.

Id.

395. See id. § SB cmts. (a)-(c).
396. Id. § 8B (3).
397. See Holmes, supra note 377, at 578-79.
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Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Interstate Electric Co. v. Frank
Adam Electric Co. , while applying an objective apparent authority
theory, also spoke in terms of "estoppel."398 Eventually, Louisiana
courts commonly described apparent authority as a species of estoppel,
drawing no distinctions between the two.399 In the 1 989 Tedesco case,
however, the supreme court made a limited reversal and suggested,
without actually holding, that it would recognize a distinction between
the two theories, relying upon the Restatement.400 At least one post

Tedesco appellate case has applied that analysis.401 However, in a
1 995 decision, Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Able Moving and
Storage Co. , the supreme court reverted to old habits, stating:
Apparent authority is

an

estoppel principle which operates in favor of

third persons seeking to bind a principal for unauthorized acts of an
agent. When the apparent scope of an agent's authority, the indicia of
authority, is relied upon by innocent third parties to their detriment, the
principal is liable.402

The Independent Fire case thus reinj ected a note of uncertainty into
this aspect of Louisiana law. As one of the authors noted, one cannot
determine whether the court was repudiating Tedesco, or merely
Further
citing the older jurisprudence in "loose dictum. '"'03
clarification has not yet come.
The comments to article

302 1

are silent on this question.

Nonethel�s, it seems clear that, if courts desire to do so, estoppel
based delictual recovery can still be recognized consistent with the
new articles. Just as a master's vicarious liability for torts committed
by a sei:rant in the course and scope of his employment arises from a
tort basis rather than the law of mandate,404 agency by estoppel can

398. 136 So. 283 (La 193 1).
399. See Holmes, supra note 377, at 576 & n.33 (citing cases)
400. See Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960, 964�65 ( La 1 989)· see also
���;:
G�
eiel�me�t, Inc.: Apparen� 1uthority Without D;trimental
,
v. 76 ( 1990) (prov1dmg commentary on the case)
.
.
· · ·
For more discussion,
see Holmes, supra note 377 at 577-79. Bne
· fly stated, the plamtiff's
apparent authority claim failed, according to the c�urt, beca�se the contract was for the sale
of an immovable and the agent lacked written authority: See id. at 577-78 nn.35-3 8. Had the
.
court applied an agency by estop el theo1bthe �amtiffs
w?uld have lost because they did
not change position. See id. at f77_79_
us, e court did not have to take a definitive
position on the theory. See id.
40 I . See Everett v Foxwood Propertie 5 84 So. 2d 1233 (
\�. g RESTATEM La. Ct. App. 1 991).
402. 650 So. 2d ?SO 752 (La 1995 ) (�
For a discussion and critiq�e of this �ase se o mes supra ENT, supra note 194, §§ 8, 88).
,
note 377.
403. See Holmes, supra note 377,' at �79.
.
404. See supra notes 115-1 22 and accompanymg
text.

����;:1�0coS:ie f'!
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also be justified as a particularized application of general tort

principles.405
Art. 3022.

Disdosed mandate or principal; thirdperson bound

A third person with whom a mandatary contracts in the name of the

principal, or in his own name as mandatary, is bound to the principal
for the performance ofthe contract.406
Art. 3023.

Undisclosed mandate or principal,; obligations of third

person
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts without disclosing

his status or the identity of the princpal
i
is bound to the princpal
i
for
the performance of the contract unless the obligation is strictly
personal or the right non-assignable. The third person may raise all
defenses that may be asserted against the mandatary or the
princpal.407
i

In general, articles 3022 and 3023 complete the disclosed

undisclosed agency puzzle discussed in connection with articles
3016-301 8408 from the standpoint of the liability of the third person.
Consistent with the common law, article 3022 gives a disclosed or
partially disclosed principal the right to enforce the contract made by
his mandatary against the third person with whom the mandatary
dealt.409 Article 3023 gives a corresponding right to an undisclosed
principal,410 unless, under general obligations law, the obligation is
strictly personal41 1 or the right is nonassignable.412 It should be noted
that each of these articles makes a crucial unstated assumption-that
the mandatary in each case was acting within his authority.
Of course, following the supreme court's recognition of
undisclosed agency in Woodlawn Park Limited Partnership v. Doster
Construction Co. ,413 neither of these articles comes as any smprise.
Perhaps the most important future issue relates to article 3023:
Whether the jurisprudence interpreting that article may recognize
exceptions beyond the two explicitly incorporated therein. For
example, at common law, a contract made for an undisclosed principal
405. See LA. Clv. CODE .ANN. arts. 23 15-2324.2 (West 1997) .
406. LA. CIV. CoDE ANN. art. 3022 (West Supp. 1 999).
407. Id. art. 3023.
408. See supra notes 290-329 and accompanying text.
.
409. Cf REsrATEMENT, supra note 194, § 292 (stating the common law with respect to
a disclosed or partially disclosed principal).
. .
.
410. Cf id. § 302 (stating the conunon law with respect to an undisclosed pnnc1pal).
41 1 . See LA. CIV. CODE .ANN. art. 1 766 (West 1 987).
412. See id. art. 1984.
For discussion, supra notes 304-308 and
413. 623 So. 2d 645 (La 1 993 ) .
accompanying text.
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is subject to rescission if (1) the third person was induce d to contract
by a representation that the agent was not acting for a principal and
(2) either the principal or agent had notice that the third person would
not have dealt directly with the principal.414 Likewise, the principal
may not be able to demand performance if performance to him would
subject the third person to "a substantially different liability" from
performance to the agent.415 It remains to be seen whether the
jurisprudence will treat the exceptions in article 3023 as exclusive or
will, as has been past experience, continue borrowing from the
common law.
IY.

CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion attempted to provide the first assessment
of Louisiana's new law of Representation and Mandate. During this
discussion, disagreements with some of the new law's choices of
policy or language have been noted. Some of these disagreements
are minor, others are not so minor. Nonetheless, as stated at the
beginning, the overall assessment of the new law remains decidedly
positive. Indeed, the new law represents a vast improvement over
the outdated provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1 870 and an
effective refinement of the jurisprudence interpreting, or ignoring,
these provisions.
At the same time, the new Louisiana law is a significant
contribution to modem civil law in general and to the law of mixed
jurisdictions in particular. While being faithful to Louisiana's civilian
heritage, the new law recognizes the realities of contemporary
transactional practice as well as the need for some uniformity with the
law of the surr
. ounding common law states. To that end' the new law
has appropriately chosen to sanction certain useful common-law
414. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94, § 304. This exception was noted in the
Woodlawn Park opinion. See Woodlawn Park, 623 So. 2d at 647 n. 7.

�

?

It shoul be emp asized that the co�on l �w distinguishes between "better temis" and
" contract
e 1rd person c�?t rescmd simply on the basis that, had h e known of the
n?
.
existence and 1dent1ty of the pnnc1pal, he would have held out for better temis
s
REs'.ATEMENT, supra note 194, § 304 �t. (c). Th�s, the landowner who contracts to s ll p
of his property to an agent whose undisclosed pnncipal was a governmental a
gency cannot
escape l1'ab1'I'1ty on th'1s theo� whereas he probably could if the undisclosed rin
· al was a
cip
P
.
fac1hty. See id.
hazardous waste disposal
·
4 1 5 . See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 94 § 3 10· Thus, a person agreem
g to act as a
of the agent cannot be forced to act as surety
.
surety tior an obl1gation
c
LOT the pnnc1
· · paI if the
pnnc1p
..&'. nnance mstead of the agent. See id § 310
. . al undertakes peuo
·
cmt (b) Of course ' tt
·
· 1s
poss1'ble that a s1mi
· ·1 ar resuJt couId be reached by concluding that th ·
·
e ngh t mvolved was
nonassignable as a result of the nature of the contract. See
LA ' CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 984
(West 1987).
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institutions such as apparent authority or undisclosed agency and to
recast them in terms compatible with a civil code. Other civil-law or
mixed jurisdictions that recognize the same need would benefit from a
careful examination of the new Louisiana law.

